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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Military Discontent Over Financial Problems

944F11994 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET
in Russian 20 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Dmitry Kholodov: "Soar With the Eagles,
Little Stars": The S-300 Missile Complex in a Stew"]

[Text] The star symbolism is quickly disappearing from the Russian army. It is being replaced by the double-headed eagle. During the next few weeks army warehouses will receive buttons with the "bird," which officers already nicknamed the "double-headed (irach" [rook]. However, the attributes of the Russian state so far do not inspire the warriors. Low morale reigns in the military. Right now officers are concerned about only one thing: Will the severance pay equal to 20 times the monthly salary be repealed, and when will it happen. According to Colonel Robert Bykov's calculation, at this point it is quite lucrative to retire. Twenty times the monthly salary amounts to R6-10 million. If one puts this in the bank, then at a 12 percent a month interest rate the officer will receive about R600,000 monthly in addition to the pension, which is more than the salary of a General Staff colonel (R560,000).

Last week newspapers reported about a suicidal officer who flew around Moscow in a transport aircraft for three hours and finally crashed not far from Kubinka. As MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET learned, in addition to an SU-27 interceptor, a MIG-31 was sent up, while the PVO [Air Defense Troops] system was for the first time given a clear order: Destroy the hijacked aircraft if the pilot steers it in the direction of the Kremlin. This was perhaps the last job for the capital city PVO. The PVO will cease to exist as a separate armed force. According to some reports, the famous Moscow rings will be "canned" like frankfurters. What "canning" modern technology means in Russia is common knowledge. In half a year the property will be transferred, and the electronic systems will be only good for the junk yard.

In the opinion of experts, sharp cuts in defense expenditures were a blow for the military department because instead of reform it attempted to implement modernization. Not even every developed country can afford this. According to the already approved 1994 budget, each work-eligible Russian pays R90,000 out of pocket a month for defense. And even that turned out not to be enough. By the way, over the past few years the Ministry of Defense plunked part of that money into outfitting the Moscow PVO with S-300 systems.

The government, meanwhile, appears to be continuing its offensive against the VPK [military-industrial complex]. Boris Yeltsin's latest declaration that the military is 3 million strong and needs to be cut left the Ministry of Defense in a state of turmoil. Feverish attempts to explain to the President that the military does not amount to three "mill," and that in addition to the

military there also are internal, railroad, and border troops, brought only one result: Yeltsin stubbornly insisted that there should be no more than 1.5 million.

Last week the Minister of Defense suddenly popped a sensational proposal: to transfer the Border Troops General Staff to his department. Skeptics said on the subject that apparently the fourth stage of "reforms a la Pavel Grachev" has begun. The major encroachment on General Nikolayev's [CINC Border Troops] department is not accidental. Prior to that, Grachev many times voiced unhappiness over the general staff's activities and the fact that the number of general-rank positions there had multiplied. "Why do we need two militaries?" But the border troops at least work hard for their generals' stars—their successful "Zaslon" ("Barrier") and Putina ("Fishing Season") operations evoke green envy in the Ministry of Defense.

To soften the explosion of discontent among the military over the sharp cut in the defense budget, all resources have been thrown into the effort to provide housing. The scale of construction is colossal. Last year the President signed decrees making investment in military construction easier. In his time Marshal Yazov had the nickname "photographer" (because every time he visited a unit with an inspection he fired someone). Army General Grachev will certainly get the nickname "builder."

Program on Paramilitary Groupings

LD0708204694

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1250 GMT on 6 August carries the 20-minute "Situation" program which profiles paramilitary movements in Russia.

The first report deals with the Soyuz "Zhivoye Koltso", ["Living Wheel" Union] interviewing two of its leaders. The video shows men in paramilitary uniform on a city street, then a press conference given by the leaders.

The unidentified presenter begins the report with some details about the organization. He says that it was "virtually" a merger of two groups: the "Otryad Rossiya" ["Russia Detachment"] and the "Soyuz Zashchitnikov Svobodnoy Rossii "Zhivoye Koltso August 91", ["August 91 Living Wheel" Union of Defenders of a Free Russia], both of which were set up after the August 1991 siege of the Russian parliament. Of the two groups, the more militant is the Otryad with its own uniform and rank badges and about 1,500 members. One of its stated aims is to assist the law enforcement bodies. It took part in the defense of Moscow City Council in October 1993 and the enforcement of the subsequent curfew.

First to be interviewed is Konstantin Troyevtsev, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the "Living Wheel" Union. He says that the "Wheel" aims to set up a Russian national guard since Russian society as a whole, he explains, is breaking down into paramilitary

organizations. After Troyevtsev, his cochairman, Viktor Maslyukov, says that the "Wheel" has strong links with the Russian army: "Colonels, rear-admirals, and generals" sit on the coordinating council. He says that the events of October 1993 show that the army has a role to play in politics.

The second report deals with the Pamyat National Patriotic Front organization, and interviews its leader, Dmitriy Vasiliyev, at length. The video shows black-shirted members marching up to a Russian Orthodox church, the inside of the Pamyat radio station, and Vasiliyev in and out of uniform.

The item begins with a radio broadcast over Russian choral church music. Vasiliyev himself is on air, appealing for new members.

The presenter then remarks that Pamyat has its own uniform, badges of rank, and internal hierarchy. It once included in its ranks Russian National Unity leader Aleksandr Barkashov and Black Hundreds [Chernyye Sotni] leader Shtilmer. It now includes the Dvizheniye Natsionalnogo Vozrozhdeniya Rossii [Russian National Rebirth Movement] set up in February 1994 by the Centrist Bloc of Parties and Movements of Russia, the Russian Conservative Union and the Dvizheniye "Rus Derzhavnyy" ["the Mighty Rus" Movement]. The presenter quotes an official statement by Vasiliyev: "Russia can only be reborn as a great power if the nation's healthy forces unite to defend the pillars of Russian statehood: the holy trinity of God, Tsar, and nation." The presenter further comments that Pamyat kept aloof from the political violence of 1991 and 1993, but only Pamyat's radio station was registered officially.

Vasiliyev is then shown addressing a small crowd. He can be heard saying: "Foreigners come here and instead of feeling like guests here they feel they own the place. They look at us today like animals in a zoo and we let them spit and smoke in our churches or wherever they like instead of gathering up that foreigner by the scruff of his neck, giving him a right shaking, and telling him: Don't you forget that you're in the holiest of holies of the Russian state now."

"In the near future, the Pamyat National Patriotic Front aims to storm the Kremlin if the authorities fail to understand that we will not put up with living like this any longer. No OMON troops or militia or anyone else will stop us."

Immediately after this speech, Vasiliyev is shown in a neat suit and tie being interviewed in a large room ornately decorated with portraits of tsars and icons. His first words refer to what he said on the street: "We'll only sort out each of them individually later on. I'm not making any threats today. I'm just giving a warning. And you know, I'm not fighting against anyone; I'm fighting for the affirmation of Russian traditions in my Russian home and I don't want to see filthy hands reaching into my home."

Asked by his unidentified interviewer whether Pamyat is law-abiding or not, Vasiliyev pauses, then said "It depends what you mean by law-abiding." "I believe that Russian Orthodox people have different laws, Christian morals which we strive to observe. It doesn't always work out that way, but that's our duty. But in our state I submit to the violence of the laws." "I have to submit to them, but a law-abiding citizen doesn't necessarily agree with every detail of those laws. In any country where people don't obey the laws you have complete anarchy and chaos. So you need to obey." Vasiliyev says that obeying a law does not mean he cannot "explain" to people that the same law "goes against morality." "Generally speaking, we're citizens until we are victorious. And I cannot see life any differently, because I know that I will arrive at that victory. I am certain of that. No matter who does drops dirt on me, no matter who stands in my way, the Lord will clear them and we will arrive at victory. Why? Because God is with us."

"Of course, someone will say that the Nazis in the Third Reich said God is with us. Once again, it's a matter of ignorance. I have nothing to lose in this life—I have lost everything. I lost when the Bolsheviks came to power. I hate them. I only hate them because they were murderers, bandits, a pack of thieves, scavengers. They put our country in the state it is in today and I will fight them. I will. Till the day I die." "If they kill me, then they will be relieving me of this monstrous existence among imbeciles."

"I have a lot of disciples and I have faith in them. They will carry on the good work."

The report on Pamyat ends with a film of a party with accordion music, presided over by a smiling Vasiliyev. A teenage boy is shown declaring his devotion to Pamyat.

The third report deals with the 'Russkoye Natsionalnoye Yedinstvo' [Russian National Unity] organization, or 'Barkashovtsy' as they are called after their leader, Aleksandr Barkashov. It contains an interview with Barkashov, with the video showing about 30 men in military uniforms training, drilling, and attending a lecture, as well as a close-up of the group's badge: a swastika crossed with two blades.

In his introduction, the presenter describes the group as the one "most willing to go into action" and says it has attracted "professional soldiers, reserve officers, and former special service workers." He says that it is an "officially registered socio-political organization" aimed at "the military-patriotic education of youth." Another aim of the group, he says, quoting Barkashov, was to found a party of the Russian people. He adds that no official data as to the Russian National Unity's membership exists. A group of armed members interviewed on a darkened street say that they are equipped with all the weapons they need. They say that membership of the group is much the same as military service, combining weapons-training and drill with sport.

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In his interview, Barkashov says that the Russian National Unity did not turn out in its full strength at the siege of the White House in October 1993 since "there just wasn't enough room for everyone." Describing the Russian National Unity's composition, he says: "Our organization comes out of the heartlands of the people. We don't have any former CPSU secretaries like Zyuganov or KGB generals like Sterligov. We have the people—workers, militiamen, servicemen."

He goes on to praise the discipline and vigilance of the Russian National Unity, and its broad contacts all over Russia. As to the need for his organization, Barkashov says: "Russia needs order—that's the main thing. That's to say, people need to be reassured that they won't be murdered, won't be robbed, that no one will humiliate them either as individuals or as a whole." "Second, there needs to be elementary social justice because there can't be any public accord when people are forced to go around rubbish-dumps looking for crusts of bread and rinds while others live on stolen money." He calls for a "redistribution" of wealth to reflect the importance of the worker to the economy. Finally, Barkashov says that groups like the Russian National Unity appeared because people in Russia could "only rely on themselves" since they could not look for protection from the "law enforcement bodies, the army, or any of the institutions which are supposed to defend people."

The final report deals with the Belaya Gvardiya [White Guard] organization and contains an interview with the head of its Ideological Department, Sergey Tomilin, and one of its advocates, publicist Valeriya Novodvorskaya. The video shows men marching and posing in prerevolutionary military uniforms identified by the presenter as those of "Kornilov's troops". Tomilin is similarly dressed with a deaths-head on his cap.

The presenter introduces the report with details of the group, saying it is based in Omsk, the capital of the White Guard movement during the Russian Civil War. It was set up "a few years ago" on the basis of a "patriotic" history club and is not registered officially. It has links with the Cossack troops and the Democratic Union, one of whose leaders is Novodvorskaya. The unnamed commander of the White Guard, the presenter continues, was behind the creation of the Beloye Dvizheniye Rossii [White Movement of Russia] which has been set up clandestinely. The membership of the White Guard is "quite small". The leadership of the organization is known as the "Staff".

In the interview, Tomilin says that the Guard has a political program for Russia which essentially calls for "firm order" and a "strong hand". He says that the organization favors a "temporary dictatorship" by someone unconnected with communism. Its immediate priority is to be registered officially in order to take part

in elections. He says that if someone like Civil War White leader Vasilii Kolchak were to take power, the White Guard would support him.

The presenter concludes the item by introducing Novodvorskaya herself who predicts that the White Guard will soon be armed and will spread all over Russia. "We", she said, "have good support in the services—not everyone voted for Zhirinovskiy. There's a civil war in the country and the behavior of each individual captain or major with a tank battalion at his command will decide who is to live here and who is not to live." "We're not going to wait any longer for the President to finally create a national guard, because by that time neither the President nor we will be among the living. We're going to act by ourselves. When the time comes, we'll have the weapons." She says that it is clear that the Russian President cannot command the armed forces and that he needs "to be defended himself."

"In order to carry out the reforms, the President needs to see not only rowdy, barefaced stragglers under red banners, but also orderly, cultured, decisive columns in black uniforms with the skull and crossbones, Kornilovian troops, Russian officers—and democrats who are willing to die in the name of reform. I think that at the beginning, in order to stop communists roaming about our streets with their antihuman symbols, in order to stop swastikas being carried around our streets, we don't even need weapons. It's enough to have good democratic units who'll stop all these beggars unarmed. You needn't depend on the army. We'll only have what we get for ourselves and the time for burying our heads in the sand has passed. There's a civil war on in the country and to win it you have to fight and resist."

14th Army Commander Lebed Plans To Return to Tiraspol Soon

*LD0708223494 Moscow NTV in Russian
1700 GMT 7 Aug 94*

[From the "Itogi" newscast]

[Text] The position of the 14th Army remains unclear for the time being, which introduces some uncertainty not only in the situation in the Dniester region, but also in the relationship between Russia and Moldova. It should also be kept in mind that the position of Army Commander Aleksandr Lebed, one of the most popular generals in the Russian Army, also remains unclear. He is officially on leave at the moment, and he is staying in Moscow. In a telephone conversation with Itogi, Aleksandr Ivanovich has made it clear that he does not have all the information about the position of the 14th Army and is not prepared to comment on it for the time being. However, taking into account the complexity of the situation which has taken shape, he is planning to return to Tiraspol soon.

General Lebed To Attend Revamped General Staff School

MK0608074994 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 6 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Dmitry Kholodov: "They Want To Make General Lebed Into a General. Swapping General Staff for National Security"]

[Text] A rumor among the officers of the General Staff Academy speaks about the imminent disbanding of this "higher school for generals." One of the academy's senior officers has told us that it may be soon taken away from the General Staff and turned into an academy of national security and that it will be training not only military commanders but also personnel for special services, state security organs, and so on.

The world-famous Academy of the General Staff of the Soviet, and then of the Russian army, has for a long time been a shop turning out generals for this country. Nearly half of its graduates finally become generals. (Incidentally, the group whose senior student was Pavel Grachev had even more capable officers—8 out of the 13 men donned a general's uniform). At any rate, graduating from the academy meant a certain increase in rank of at least one step. But the main asset acquired by graduates of the academy was lots of reliable friends and indispensable connections aiding subsequent moves up the ladder. They are now awaiting a new student in the academy—General Lebed, who having risen to the rank of general did not finish the General Staff Academy, and is expected to study two years after the imminent disbandment of the 14th Army. ?? The West speaks very highly about the teaching personnel of the academy. Until now this has been not so much an institution of learning as an institution of science. It is, apparently, supposed that the General Staff Academy's scientific potential is really going to advance the drawn out process of creating a national security concept, from which the construction of the Russian state should have been started in the first place.

Military Cadets Said Disaffected With Yeltsin

94UM05274 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 28, 2 Aug 94 [Signed to press 26 Jul 94] p 2

[Article by Lidiya Timofeyeva: "Viktor Stepanovich, Greetings From Caesar!"]

[Text] I do not know whose reasoning - that of Caesar or Machiavelli - guided Boris Yeltsin three years ago, but he did win the first presidential elections thanks to senior level officers (young colonels and majors) who were joined by junior commanders casting their votes for him.

Today, as indicated by a survey of cadets, adjutants, and instructors in Moscow military academies, their preferences have changed. They feel that Viktor Chernomyrdin stands the best chance of taking forthcoming presidential elections. He has the confidence of more than half the respondents, with almost 60 percent

approving the efforts being exerted by the Russian Government in the area of holding down inflation.

However, the elections are a long way off. Army commanders are in favor of supporting any decisive and progressive person holding the position of president and that of minister of defense (they have in mind as minister Alexander Lebed, 14th Army commander in the Dniester area), a person who would finally do something about real reforms in the Army, effect considerable improvement in material welfare of servicemen, provide the latter and their dependents with social guarantees, and apply an independent foreign policy, one oriented toward national interests, with CIS member countries deriving maximum benefit.

It is interesting that, in spite of the negative reactions the people displayed relative to the actions taken by the military during the October storming of the White House, high-ranking officers are of the opinion that, to resolve conflict situations and cool down any emerging signs of a civil war, the use of the Armed Forces is necessary.

Politicians may react to the given questions in their own way. But the good soldier Schweik was not very far from the truth in maintaining that Franz Joseph lost a war only because he was deficient in feeding his army.

Edict Creates Military University, Economic Training Faculty

94UM05194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jul 94 p 9

[Ukase No. 1523 of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Establishment of a Military University and a Military Finance and Economics Faculty at the Finance Academy of the Government of the Russian Federation" under the rubric "Official Section"]

[Text] In order to improve the system of training and advanced training of military specialists in the finance and economic, legal, philological and other humanitarian specialties for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and to expand research in these fields, I hereby decree:

1. That a Military University and a Military Finance and Economics Faculty is to be created at the Finance Academy of the Government of the Russian Federation out of the Military Academy of Economics, Finance and Law of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and (hereafter referred to as the Military Finance and Economics Faculty).

2. That the following is assigned:

to the Military University, the training, advanced training and skills enhancement of instructors in the socioeconomic and humanitarian disciplines with a higher education and officers in the legal, philological and other humanitarian disciplines with a higher specialized military education;

to the Military Finance and Economics Faculty, the training, advanced training and skills enhancement of officers in the finance and economics disciplines with a higher military education;

that the Military University and the Finance and Economics Faculty is charged also with conducting scientific research in the corresponding fields.

3. That the following training periods are established:

at the Military University for civilians with a secondary (complete) general education or a beginning professional education, five years; for officers with a higher professional education, three year;

in the education Finance and Economics Faculty, three years.

Individuals who have completed the Military University and the Military Finance and Economics Faculty are issued the state diplomas established for educational institutions of the Russian Federation offering a higher professional education.

4. That the following are assigned:

to the Military University, the materials and equipment base of the Humanitarian Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Military Academy of Economics, Finance and Law of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, along with land plots, training, administration and dwelling buildings and installations, as well as other real estate and moveable property, armaments and military equipment, with the exception of the materials and equipment base of the finance and economics and the finance and credit faculties of the Military Academy of Economics, Finance and Law of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

to the Military Finance and Economics Faculty, the materials and equipment base of the finance and economics and the finance and credit faculties of the Military Academy of Economics, Finance and Law of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, along with land plots, training, administration and dwelling buildings and installations, as well as other real estate and moveable property, armaments and equipment.

5. That the Military University and the Military Finance and Economics Faculty is to be created within the limits of the budget allocations and the official numerical strength of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
6. That Ukase No. 1498 issued by the president of the Russian Federation on 30 November 1992, "On the Military Academy of Economics, Finance and Law of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" (Collection of Enactments of the President and the Government of the Russian Federation, No. 23, 1992, p. 1978) is no longer in effect.

That instructions No. RP-3003 issued by the president of the USSR on 7 December 1991 are not valid within the Russian Federation.

7. That this ukase takes effect at the moment of its promulgation.

Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

Moscow, the Kremlin

20 July 1994

Quality of Military Academy Entrants

*MM2907095794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Jul 94 p 1*

[Report by Oleg Falichev: "Lieutenants of the 21st Century. They Are Joining Russia's Military Higher Educational Establishments Now"]

[Text] The emotional and unforgettable time of the military school admission examinations.... Each of us officers knows well what that means. After all, when you have made your choice, you do not simply enter a higher educational establishment but a military higher educational establishment and you link your subsequent life with the army and consequently with the hardships and deprivations of service. And it is the duty of the admission commissions to determine precisely how considered that step is, what motives guide a young man entering an army career. That is particularly important today when the Armed Forces and with them the top military school are passing through a complex stage of reform and changes, when the prestige of military service is dropping and competition for entry to military schools is declining.

What are this year's features? Alas, the situation on this plane does not differ greatly from last year. Of course, there are popular military higher educational establishments for which competition is traditionally high. They include the Ryazan higher airborne command school, the Russian Federation Armed Forces Military Academy of Economics, Finances, and Law (recently transformed into the Military University), the Military Automotive Institute, and a number of others. They have three to five applicants and more competing for each place. Thus the above-mentioned Russian Federation Armed Forces Military Academy of Economics, Finances, and Law received nearly 400 personal applications from young women (!) while they select only a group of 25-30. In recent years there has also been an increase in competition to the rear services schools and the Yaroslavl higher military finance school. The artillery, chemical, naval, and secondary aviation technical schools have become less popular. Now there is virtually no competition even for the previously popular Moscow higher combined-arms command school. An under-recruitment of candidates has been noted recently in some of the above-mentioned schools.

Actually, the trend has persisted this year, which can be seen from the selection of candidates in the districts and branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The plan for recruiting candidates from the ranks of young civilians, for instance, was fulfilled far from everywhere. Thus, as of 1 June it was fulfilled only 20.6 percent in the Far East Military District and 23.9 percent in the Ural Military District. For draftee servicemen the figure is even worse: Not a single district has passed even the 50 percent mark.

Of course these figures changed somewhat by the start of the admission examinations. Here we must obviously also consider the overall shortage of draftee resources and the fact that military commissariats have found themselves in tough conditions. But, as we can see, the picture is not very cheerful. Particularly if you consider that many of the students who are admitted will, as practice shows, be expelled for failing to study. Here are the figures. Whereas in 1987 such students were 4.1 percent of the total, in 1993 they accounted for 13.4 percent. A more than threefold increase!

"The quality of what we can figuratively refer to as the human material from which candidates have to be selected has deteriorated," Lieutenant General Genadiy Radionov, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry GUPiRK [exact expansion unknown, possibly Main Directorate of Training and Work with Cadres (glavnoye upravleniye podgotovki i raboty s kadrami)] director for cadres training and vuzes said not so long ago in a talk with me. "There has been an increase in the number of boys with signs of drug addiction and alcoholism..."

Unfortunately this "reverberates" down the years. Graduates when they have graduated from the military schools break their contract. And that when recently a very great deal has been done and is being done to enhance the prestige of the study and teaching of the fundamental disciplines. For instance, for the first time state educational standards have been developed and will be placed at the foundation of the planning of the study process, making it possible to raise the level of demands on graduates and improve the quality of their training. Privileges and benefits have been introduced for students and cadets who do well, including the opportunity to study elective (chosen) disciplines, early graduation, or the simultaneous study of one more speciality with the issue of a second diploma, and other benefits.

"It is also of some importance that this year a substantial proportion of the combined-arms command schools have switched to a five-year course of study," says Colonel Yuriy Maksimov, senior instructor at the Russian Federation Defense Ministry GUPiRK group for staffing higher educational establishments and selection.

"They will now be command engineering schools and after graduation the graduates will receive diplomas of the general civilian type."

I should add that students are now selected for these schools for both four-year and five-year courses so that there is no "gap" in the output of graduates. Both will receive diplomas of the same general civilian type.

The following trend has also emerged. Higher educational establishments are, alas, mainly being filled from local draftees. Whereas previously a young man from the Far East could enter, for instance, the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School, for instance, now migration processes have been reduced to a minimum. That is hardly a good thing, since officers have to serve in various parts of the country. Schools are situated mainly in the European part.

The military commissariats are also having a hard time. Whereas before they worked as "filters" when selecting young men, weeding out feeble candidates, now, under conditions where there is a shortage of draftees, they must increasingly operate as "magnets." After all, for a long time now there has been no military training as such in schools and no one give vocational guidance for the military professions. That mission has also been placed entirely on the military commissariats.

And one last point. The young Russian men who have found themselves in the near abroad after the collapse of the USSR are in a complex position. Particularly those who have adopted different citizenship. Their way to Russian military higher educational establishments is virtually barred. Only those who submit documents confirming their Russian citizenship can holdy enter any military school or academy in the Russian Federation. And in that case if they are summoned by a higher educational establishment their travel expenses should be paid from their place of residence to the military educational establishment and if they are not admitted their return fare should be paid too. That is stipulated in the deputy defense minister's 10 June 1993 DZ-58 directive "on the procedure for the admission to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry military educational establishments of vocational training of persons living on the territory of the CIS states and the Baltic States and the Republic of Georgia." This directive authorizes the chiefs of military educational establishments to register these citizens without a compulsory character reference from their place of work or study.

A little time will elapse and yesterday's schoolboys, workers, and soldiers will be in cadets' uniform. How will their army service take shape? What will the Russian Army be like in five years' time? You cannot give a simple answer to these questions. All the greater reason for wishing success on their difficult path to these young men—the lieutenants of the 21st Century.

Medical Deferments for Draftees Discussed

94UM0505A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jul 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Unfit for the Draft"]

[Text] For what ailments are citizens subject to the draft, and for what ones are they exempt?

The person who wants to thoroughly clarify the answer to this question should familiarize himself with Order No. 260 of the USSR minister of defense of 9 September 1987. The complete title is: "On Implementation of Medical Examination in the USSR Armed Forces (for Peacetime and Wartime)."

However, Appendix 1 of this order is the one we are interested in and is written using this language: "lime salt deposits in the front section of the fibrous ring or in the pulposus nucleus" and so forth. If a draftee is in a position to find these organs in himself and identify lime salts, he maybe "will make a diagnosis." But if he does not know what a "fibrous ring" or "pulposus nucleus" is? So, the accessibility of Order No. 260 is accessibility of Chinese characteristics: "I see, but do not understand..."

Moreover, in the time that has passed since 9 September 1987, the order has been enriched with a large number of supplements and changes. There is no guarantee that military boards and physician specialists participating in the medical examination regularly correct their copy. So, the order and comments are required by both physicians and draftees. The newspaper VASHE PRAVO began regularly printing advice of specialists. The journal SOTSIALNAYA ZASHCHITA gives more complete and detailed information on this topic.

The most complete information on the official list of diseases hindering service in the Army, and comments on it will be included in a separate brochure from the library, which is published jointly by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and SOTSIALNAYA ZASHCHITA. The subscription to the library continues. In the AnFovskiy Catalog, its index is 73097. In the TsRPA ROSPECHAT [Russian Press], its index is 73017.

One can also acquire individual issues. To do this, one should transfer the cost of one brochure—15,000 rubles—to the journal SOTSIALNAYA ZASHCHITA—r/o 609298, Central Department [TsO] of the Moscow Business Bank, MFO [Moscow Finance Department], 44583145, Code V-5, Correspondent Account 145161700 GRKTs GUTsB, Moscow, MFO 201791.

Send a copy with payment and return address and the title of the collection "Unfit for the Draft" to the following address: Moscow, 101000, Box 915.

Today, our newspaper is offering one of the most significant supplements to Order No. 260. This is another order signed by the minister of defense and dated 20 February 1993, No. 68: "On Making Changes to the Statute on Medical Examination in the Armed Forces."

Colonel of Medical Service Aleksey Tarasov, department chief of the Central Medical Board of the Ministry of Defense.

Dotting the 'i'

From Order No. 68:

"...8. Paragraph four of Article 32 should read as follows:

"Item 'V' pertains to chronic infectious and infectious-allergic diseases of the joints with infrequent (once a year) aggravations that are not incapacitating."

Comments: Before, the paragraph with the new wording which the reader just became familiar with looked this way: "Item 'V' pertains to the consequences of acute infectious and infectious-allergic diseases of the joints with minor disruption of their function that is not incapacitating." Attachment No. 2 (List of Illnesses and Physical Defects) to Order No. 260 states that draftees with such illnesses are unfit for military service during peacetime. However, how do you distinguish "minor disruption," and what are its symptoms? Now the "i" has been dotted—for exemption from the draft, the aggravation must occur at least once a year.

A question arises as to how to distinguish among the persons "registering a complaint" those who are truly sick from malingerers. For this, the military commissariat requests medical documents from the public health institutions where the young man was treated. And it checks if they reflect appeals in connection with the joint illness and its aggravations.

Of course, on the threshold of being drafted, the lad could consult his doctor not once a year but 10 times: "Ouch, it hurts!" But it is up to the doctor and specialist to find out how valid the complaint is. An X-ray, for example, provides objective data about the joint illness. It also serves as a basis for the military physician's decision.

Sick or Not Sick

Let us assume a young man complains about a pain in the backbone, osteochondrosis. Before, the text of Order No. 260 stated (paragraph five of Article 32):

"Minor disruption of function assumes the lack of objective symptoms of joint damage with the presence of moderate painful, fast-moving sensations in them under a physical load."

Comments: A young man complained that his spine hurt, that he could not bend over or straighten up—outwardly, nothing was apparent. The physician examined him to see if he was lying or telling the truth. But what is a physician to do if there are no "objective signs of joint damage?"

Meanwhile, such signs are known to medicine. These are changes that are accessible to the "eye" of the X-ray machine. And now the text will read differently.

According to Order No. 68, it lists namely those changes which are recorded on the X-ray picture. Here is the new wording:

9. Paragraph five of Article 36 is to read as follows:

"Item 'V' pertains to recorded congenital or acquired curvatures of the spine, accompanied by rotation of vertebrae (second degree scoliosis, osteochondropathic kyphosis with a wedge-shaped deformation of 2-3 or more vertebral bodies, and others); limited deforming spondylosis (damage to 2-3 or more vertebral bodies) and intervertebral osteochondrosis (damage to 2-3 or more intervertebral disks) with pain syndrome under considerable physical loads and with clear anatomical signs of deformations discovered during clinical study of X-rays. Spondylosis anatomically manifests itself as coracoid growths engrossing the entire circumference of the surrounding plates and as deformation of the vertebrae. Signs of clinical manifestation of chondrosis are: disruption of static function of the damaged section of the vertebra—straightening of cervical (lumbar) lordosis or even formation of kyphosis, a combination of local lordosis and kyphosis instead of uniform lordosis. Roentgenological symptoms of intervertebral chondrosis are: a) disruption of the shape of vertebra (disruption of static function); b) decrease in height of intervertebral disk; c) lime salt deposits in the front section of the fibrous ring or in the pulposus nucleus; d) shifting of vertebral bodies (front, rear, and lateral); determined during standard roentgenography; e) mobility pathology in a segment (disruption of dynamic function); f) retention of precise contours of all surfaces of vertebral bodies and the absence of destructive changes in them. With a mixed form, intervertebral osteochondrosis, regional bony growths forming in the flatness of the disk and continuing the areas of the vertebral bodies, as well as subchondral osteosclerosis, which shows up on X-rays with a distinct image of the structure, are added to the enumerated signs. The pain syndrome under physical load should be confirmed by repeated appeals for medical assistance, which are reflected in medical documents of the person being examined. The sum total of the enumerated clinical and roentgenological signs provides grounds for applying item 'V' of this article."

This text is incomprehensible to an uneducated person. But every person will note the words with the root "roentgen." It is namely the pictures with all their objectivity that place a limit on the endless arguments on the topic: "Sick or Not Sick." Every young person can consult a physician specialist and see on the picture the signs of the ailment he has.

One should not forget, X-ray pictures for the military commissariat are "neutral persons" in civilian medical institutions, although at the direction of the military commissariat. Why should they "play up to" the draft board?

The nature of fallen arches is also often determined from X-ray pictures. Disputes with physicians on this subject have noticeably diminished already.

POLICY

Grachev on Progress of Military Reforms

LD660818/1994 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1600 GMT 5 Aug 94

[Editorial report] Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1600 GMT on 5 August, on the "Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry, carries a report by Mikhail Borikov on the need for reforms in the Russian armed forces. He illustrates his various points with recordings of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev commenting on the subject.

Grachev says that reforms in the Russian Army are proceeding steadily, and the general combat readiness of the troops is improving after the drawback they suffered following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Grachev then outlines the main areas of reorganization being carried out in the forces.

[Begin Grachev recording] During 1993 and 1994 a new system of combat readiness of the armed forces has been formed, on the whole. We started to form new armed forces groupings on the territory of Russia, beginning with the Moscow and North Caucasus military districts, which received troops withdrawn from the East European countries, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. We started setting up mobile forces, though with great difficulties. In our estimation, their maneuverability and equipment should, to a certain extent, compensate for the reduction in the numerical and fighting strength of the Armed Forces. Of course, the Air Assault Troops are the backbone of the armed forces. We have already created units in each military district—either a division, as in the Leningrad and Maritime military district, or brigades, as in other districts. They are based on motorized-rifle formations and are to be deployed as part of the Mobile Forces. These units have already been brought up to strength. They closely interact with Military Transport Aviation and the Air Assault Troops. Each district now also has special purpose brigades which, if needed, can also be deployed as mobile forces.

This year, organization work involved in setting up the Mobile Forces will be completed, as well as a whole range of experiments the results of which will form a basis for appropriate decisions which are to be taken on the further development of the armed forces. In 1994 our main efforts will probably be concentrated on completing the withdrawal of the Russian troops from abroad, except the military bases on which we have agreements. By 1 January 1995 we will reach the numerical strength specified by the federal law—1 million 917 thousand men. We hope to reach this target by 1 October in accordance with the President's verbal instruction and the law on bringing the strength of the army down to 1.5 million. [end recording]

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Constitutional Limit on Defense Spending Proposed

(APR 1994) *Moscow, MIDDAY Press Bulletin 21/22/94—1*

(Amovnoy Ernst Cherny) comments in the Russian press: "Paradox: Russia Spending More on Arms Than Entire USSR—Military Doctrine Is Less Aggressive, but Military Spending Is Up!"

Text: There is one indispensable rule that is especially important for countries that want to emerge from economic crisis. Spending on the state, and especially military spending, must precisely conform to the countries' actual economic possibilities. Any attempt to evade this strict rule will prevent a country from coping with its economic problems.

From 1991 to the moment Russia has faced the problem of the lack of a 1994 budget, a problem that caused various political and military clashes. There were especially sharp disputes over military spending. The 1994 budget law published in July indicates 41.6 trillion rubles for military spending. However, the military had requested 87 trillion rubles for its needs. The Federation Council recommended that 55 trillion be appropriated for this, but the State Duma agreed to 41.5 trillion rubles.

It is worthwhile to determine how big or small the requested spending was and whether the appropriated funds are sufficient.

Soviet defense spending in 1991 was 70 billion rubles, at a time when the USSR population was nearly 300 million and state defense spending was approximately 232 rubles per capita.

In order to examine defense expenditures, let us convert Russia's 1994 defense spending to 1990 prices, bearing in mind that prices rose in that period by three orders of magnitude. The result is that the military requested 87 billion rubles, not 87 trillion. The Federation Council proposed an appropriation of 55 billion, while the State Duma agreed to provide only 41.5 billion rubles.

Let us compare this with the data for USSR defense spending in 1990, bearing in mind that Russia now has a population on the order of 150 million people, or half that of the entire Soviet Union. It turns out, then, that the requested funding for Russian military spending would conform to USSR spending of 194 billion, 110 billion and 83 billion rubles. We should also point out that even the Russian military spending under the State Duma option is 26 percent higher than the spending of the entire USSR in 1990. The amount of funding requested by the military was 70 percent higher and the amount proposed by the Federation Council 50 percent higher than the USSR's military spending in comparable prices.

One could also use a different calculation method that involves converting military spending for that same year into a per capita figure. The result for the amount requested by the military is 580 rubles, for the amount suggested by the Federation Council 366 rubles, and in

the option adopted by the State Duma 232 rubles. These figures are 150 percent, 100 percent and 100 percent, respectively, higher than USSR spending in 1990 per capita. In the law adopted by the State Duma, the 1994 military spending is also 55 percent higher than the USSR's expenditures, not to mention the fact that there are also certain off-budget funds for the same purposes.

All this illustrates rather convincingly what is happening in the Russian defense budget. After eight years of promises aimed at reducing military spending and reducing the tax burden, nothing has really happened, and the military expenditures have even increased. It is as in Alexander Pushkin's *Yermak*: "In order to decrease, it is essential to increase."

It is clear why USSR military spending was so extraordinarily high. Such spending was fully in keeping with the military doctrine aimed at achieving a total annihilation of the enemy, or at least turning our country into an armed camp and transforming it into an enemy, or at maintaining a nuclear parity with the minimum. Now that the international situation has changed, military changed and become generally favorable, the USSR no longer could afford to sharply reduce military spending. Especially since the Russian economy is unable to continue to sustain such spending, with the result that with the country's defense capability and its general and political fond of rattling sabers would be ruined armaments.

Such high spending is needed only if the country existed solely in order to maintain its armed forces and the population at whose expense this expenditure had consented to this. This would also be justified if extensive influence had been acquired by political forces, intent on launching some insane march southward or in some other direction. In any other case such a policy cannot stand up to criticism.

If, on the other hand, Russia's policy is to remain a peace-loving one, Russia doesn't need high defense spending. But it is clearly hard to stand up to the requests and pressure of the "high maneuverable" marshals and generals. Apparently in fear of offending and losing them (the domestic political situation is complex), the president and government are pretending that the problem doesn't exist. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that the key to saving Russia and hence its defense complex, lies in sharply cutting spending on defense and the military-industrial complex.

The problem of defense spending in Russia has become a special urgency in that it essentially eliminates hopes of reducing the tax burden and bringing about economic recovery. It also involves yet another source of the danger of stepped-up money emission—spending, considering that the budget deficit is rather sizable already.

Moreover, it is quite clear that our military spending, which requires a sizable part of a very meager public good—the gross domestic product (whose size, it seems, is not even known for certain)—is beyond the means of not just Russia, but any economically developed country.

Attempts to achieve parity in defense spending with the United States ended in economic collapse for the USSR and, without a doubt, will lead to the collapse of the Russian economy. A high absolute magnitude of military spending is accessible only to a developed and highly efficient economy. This is apparently unclear to the generals and executives of the military-industrial complex.

In the United States, military spending imposes no special strain on the nation's economy because it amounts to just six percent on the gross domestic product. Defense spending in other developed countries amounts ranges from one percent to five percent of gross domestic product.

In view of our unflagging aspiration to maximize defense spending and the size of our Armed Forces, they should in peacetime be constitutionally limited to certain parameters—say, one percent of the population and six percent to eight percent of gross domestic product. The absolute figures for such spending could grow only as the economy grew, while remaining low in percentage terms, as is the practice in developed countries.

RF Defense Ministry Spending Defended

944F11204 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 26 Jul 94 p.3

[Article by Sergey Modestov, consultant to the RF presidential assistant for national security: "Russia Spends as Much on the Army as the USSR Owes It: The Issue of Parity With the USA Has No Place on the Agenda"]

[Text] Last Saturday the newspaper *SEGODNYA* published an article titled "Russia Spends More on the Army Than All of the USSR" by Ernst Chernyy, a member of the Public Chamber.

It would be interesting after reading that article to examine how great or small the requested resources (initially 87 trillion rubles, and ultimately R55 trillion) and resources actually allocated (R40.6 trillion) really are.

Mr. Chernyy recalls that in 1990 the USSR's defense expenditures were R70 billion, which given a population of around 300 million meant spending approximately R233 per person for defense.

What next? In order to gain an understanding of defense outlays Mr. Chernyy cites Russia's military expenditures for 1994 at the scale of 1990 prices. In this case he takes account of the fact that "prices increased by three orders of magnitude during this time."

As a result he discovers "that the military asked for R87 billion, and not 87 trillion. The Council of the Federation proposed appropriating 55 billion, while the State Duma would agree to providing only R41.5 billion."

There is more. Comparing these amounts with the defense expenditures of the USSR for 1990, the author recalls that "Russia's population today is on the order of 150 million—that is, twice less than what was in all of the Soviet Union." In the final analysis Ernst Chernyy

finds that "the volume requested to fund Russia's military expenditures would correspond to expenditures by the USSR amounting to R194, 110 and 83 billion." Thus it turns out that Russia's military expenditures proposed by the Ministry of Defense, the Council of the Federation and the State Duma are 2.7, 1.5 and 1.2 times higher (respectively) than the military expenditures of the USSR in comparable prices.

The variants proposed by the author and others for comparison are expressed per-capita. Naturally all three variants (of the military, and of the upper and lower chambers of the Federal Assembly) are frightening in the amount by which they exceed the per-capita indicator for 1990: R580, 366 and 276 as opposed to the R233 cited above.

Mr. Chernyy's main secret lies in those "three orders of magnitude" by which he identifies the scale of price changes between 1990 and 1994.

However, we hardly need prove that the actual devaluation of money is not 1,000 but a minimum of 2,000 times (such are the data at least for the end of 1993).

This circumstance changes Mr. Chernyy's conclusions significantly: In 1990 prices, the funding volume requested by the military is not R87 billion but R43.5 billion; the defense expenditures proposed by the Council of the Federation are not R55 billion but R27.5 billion; the amount actually allocated transforms from R40.6 billion to R20.3 billion.

After these corrections, there is probably no need to discuss the fact that the necessary level of financing of defense in Russia, with its population of 150 million, cannot be determined using the proportions $300:70=150:x$. For example the missile attack warning system, which had belonged to the former USSR, was inherited by the Russian Federation. And presence of contracting civilians in the military also presupposes a different level of expenditure to maintain the armed forces.

To a certain degree the current financial needs of the army are the consequence of chronic underfinancing of the USSR military establishment. For practical purposes these are but appropriations that had been deferred to the future, they are debts transferred to us from the past associated with construction of housing for military servicemen, environmental protection, and development of safe means of recycling some forms of weapons. Now we are compelled to pay off on the old accounts—build homes, recultivate freed lands, and rack our brains to find ways to process wastes accumulated from facilities of the navy's nuclear power engineering complex and to rid ourselves in time of the reserves of chemical weapons (this one program requires around R2 trillion in current prices).

Ernst Chernyy would like to protect Russia's economy from "attempts to attain parity in defense expenditures with the United States." One would have to know very little about the problems of the military budget to be able to pose such a goal. In this connection it would make

sense to cite a statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry at Senate hearings on 12 July of this year: "The U.S. military budget—\$263 billion—exceeds by almost four times the defense expenditures of eight probable adversaries taken together—Russia, China, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Iran, Syria and Cuba."

New Journal 'ARMEYSKIY SBORNIK' Launched

MM0808075794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Colonel Mikhail Zakharchuk: "For Military Professionals"]

[Text] The first issue of ARMEYSKIY SBORNIK [Army Collection]—a journal for military professionals—has been published. The new publication is noteworthy, first, in that it partially amalgamates the editorial collectives of AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, VOYENNO-EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL, VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBO-RONY, and VOYENNNY VESTNIK. Second, the monthly is the legal successor and heir of VOYENNNY SBORNIK, which was published in the Russian Army from 1858 onward.

ARMEYSKIY SBORNIK, whose founder is the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, is naturally designed primarily for officer personnel of the tactical echelon.

Paper Asks: Why Send Russians To Die in FSU Trouble Spots?

MM2807193994 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Jul 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Yevgeniy Smirnov and Sergey Chernykh under the "CIS Wars" rubric: "Since the Start of the 1990's Over 1,500 Russian Servicemen Have Died in Trouble Spots. How Many More Will Not Return From Battle?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] According to figures from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, as at 20 March this year a total of 107 Russian servicemen had been killed and 193 wounded while carrying out peacekeeping operations.

Of these, two died and nine were wounded in the former Yugoslavia.

16 were killed and 25 wounded in the Dniester region, two were killed and one wounded in South Ossetia,

28 were killed and 60 wounded in North Ossetia and Ingushetia,

six were killed and 15 wounded in Abkhazia,

53 were killed and 77 wounded in Tajikistan.

These figures only include casualties of officially declared peacekeeping operations and only refer to officially declared losses without taking MIA's into account. The total number of Russian casualties in the "trouble spots" is

an order of magnitude bigger, according to unofficial information from the same ministry. [passage omitted]

Last year 33 border guards died on the Tajik-Afghan border. This year the total is 25. Apparently figures for losses on other borders are secret.

But Russia does not have a border either with Afghanistan or with Tajikistan.

Border Guards specialists believe that if the Afghan Government was more with-it, it would long ago have written an indignant letter to the United Nations complaining that Russia's "aggressively disposed forces" were carrying out overt combat operations on the borders of its state. [passage omitted]

Last October the conflict in west Georgia escalated another notch. Nowadays few can remember who was fighting whom and why—what has it got to do with ordinary Russians anyway? However, the crew of a Russian armored personnel carrier was shot there. Five guys. A news conference was held at the time at the headquarters of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus. The Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus command again thumped the table and declared there would be no further losses. They also declared that in line with an order from the defense minister, Russian servicemen would shoot to kill if they encountered aggression.

And so?

The Western powers, whose example we regularly quote, evacuate their citizens at the slightest hint of trouble, sever diplomatic relations, and dispatch a rapid-reaction naval force to the scene of an incident. In the West this pattern of behavior has even given rise to the jaunty phrase: "Send in the marines!" Everybody still remembers the missile strike against Baghdad which was unleashed merely because an Iraqi citizen was suspected of preparing an assassination attempt on the former U.S. President. There are plenty of examples of this sort of thing.

God preserve us from calls to start full-scale wars. But if "trouble spots" on the territory of the former USSR really do fall within the sphere of Russia's vitally important interests, then perhaps it is worth reexamining deep-rooted notions such as the "limited contingent," for example. The kind of half-measures which the Russian leadership is using in Tajikistan will lead nowhere. What is the point of a "fortified border post" if the 50 soldiers manning it can be pinned down by one sniper's rifle and a night vision device? What is the point of defending the border if the hardware deployed there is merely being used as a target?

These guys are certainly not occupiers, they are far from being "commandos," and they have nothing in common with French foreign legionnaires, who have taken part in every war in the 20th century.

The typical serviceman from the Russian Army killed in a "trouble spot" is a sociable man, fond of company, and

undistinguished by a powerful frame or any particular aggression. Another sad fact is that single parents lose their children in the Army more than most.

...The evening roll call:

"Vladimir Smirnov!"

"Vladimir Smirnov met the death of the brave in fighting for the freedom and independence of our motherland."

Until recently this was how it used to be in companies whose lists recorded the names of heroes forever. Now everything has changed: A report to the military commissariat, followed by a zinc coffin and a little bag containing personal belongings from the deceased's bedside table. And nowadays the commander does not write in the telegram of condolence: "Your son died for...."

For what?

GROUND TROOPS

Polish-Made Reactive Armor Described

94UM0369B Warsaw *NOWA TECHNIKA WOJSKOWA*
in Polish Nos 2-3, Feb-Mar 94 pp 23-24

[Article by A. Wisniewski]

[Text] ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MODERN FIREARMS Editors: Andrzej Cieplinski and
Ryszard Wozniak

ERAWA is the Polish version of a reactive armor intended for shielding the main armor of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, armored transport vehicles, stationary fortifications, etc. The ERAWA armor was developed at the Military Engineering Institute of Armaments in Zielonka. Research done on it had begun in 1986 and it was adopted in 1991. Proprietary rights are protected by the Polish patent No 156,463. The name of this armor is derived from the English "ERA" (Explosive Reactive Armour = explosively reacting armor) and the initials WA of the chief inventor Adam Wisniewski.

This Polish reactive armor is available in two versions: unilateral ERAWA-1 and bilateral ERAWA-2. Both consist of rectangular metal segments filled with an explosive material, their outer surfaces are identical, and both are installed in the same manner. The segments are individually screwed onto the basic armor plate as close as possible to one another so as to maximize the protected area. A close packing of the segments makes it also possible to tightly cover the reactive armor with a layer of microwave absorbent and thus decrease the likelihood of the combat vehicle being detected by a ground or airborne enemy radar.

When such a segment is hit by a missile, detonation of the explosive material contained in that segment scatters the kinetic energy of a hollow-charge jet or a striking missile. The ERAWA armor decreases the depth to which a hollow-charge jet penetrates by 50-70 % or more and weakens the piercing ability of subcaliber missiles by




Czołg T-72 pokryty 394 segmentami pancerza reaktywnego ERAWA: 108 — na wieży, 118 — na kadłubie i 2 x 84 — na bocznych ekranach przeciwkumulacyjnych. Stanowi to 9 m² powierzchni ochranianej czołgu (W. Gugala)

T-72 tank covered with 394 segments of ERAWA reactive armor: 108 on the turret, 118 on the hull, 84 on each of the two lateral anti-hollow-charge shields. This amounts to protection of a 9 m² large tank surface (by W. Gugala)


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30-40 %. The sensitivity of the explosive material is adjusted so as to ensure that no detonation will take place in the reactive segment following a hit by artillery missiles of smaller than 82 mm caliber. The reactive segments are also immune to flames of burning napalm, gasoline, and incendiary war heads. Replacing detonated or destroyed segments is a simple operation, which can be performed in the field.

ERAWA (Bumar) Armor Segments




Segmenty pancerza Erawa (Bumar)



Przebieg ataku pancernego monolitycznej RHA (rolled homogeneous steel armor) płytą przez pocisk kumulacyjny (przed wybuchem).
a. bez pancerza reaktywnego, b. z pancerzem ERAWA-1, c. z pancerzem ERAWA-2. 1 — pocisk kumulacyjny (przed wybuchem).

Piercing of a monolithic RHA (rolled homogeneous-steel armor) plate by a hollow-charge jet: a. without reactive armor, b. with ERAWA-1 reactive armor, c. with ERAWA-2 reactive armor, 1- hollow charge (before explosion).

Segments of ERAWA Reactive Armor on "Twardy" Tank



Segmenty pancerza reaktywnego ERAWA na czołgu Twardy

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T-72 and Other T-Series Fire Control Systems Described

94UM03694 Warsaw NOWA TECHNIKA WOJSKOWA
in Polish Nos 2-3, Feb-Mar 94 pp 1-6

[Article by Jan Wojciechowski]

[Text] PROJECT: MODERNIZATION OF FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM IN T-72 AND OTHER T-SERIES TANKS

Conventional principles of operating T-series tanks: how to apply them to a smaller number of tanks?

Under modern combat conditions just possessing more T-72 tanks than the enemy will not any more ensure victory. The enemy often deploys highly mobile vehicles equipped with better fire control systems. In such a situation larger tank formations may be very well be defeated by fewer tanks adequately protected against damage and equipped with modern fire control systems which ensure effective fire on the move, 24 hours around the clock under diverse weather conditions. Equipping T-series tanks with a fire control system (FCS) should raise the quality of these tanks to about 80 percent quality of Western tanks, with much smaller financial investments and yet with the possibility of attaining a decisive superiority over an enemy possessing identical but conventional vehicles. The field staff assured of the qualitative superiority of its tanks can feel safe even with a smaller number of them. When purchasing tanks, the customer is guided foremost by their combat capabilities. Every soldier wants to be operating the best equipment his country can afford and wants to believe in winning the next likely battle. Modernization of T-72 vehicles by equipping them with the TIGER FCS will make these goals attainable without the purchase of new tanks. After comparing the TIGER FCS with other proposed T-72 modernization schemes one can say that its user will have a decisive edge over users of other T-series and older vehicles.

Outcome of Persian Gulf war: causes of T-72 weakness

During the Persian Gulf war the tanks used by the Allied Forces were not only faster and more dynamic than the Iraqi tanks but also able to travel longer distance. They were equipped with better cannon and armor, carried better ammunition, used better laser rangefinders, fire control, and thermal imaging Systems. The TIGER FCS gives T-72 tanks the same capabilities in terms of thermal imaging, range-finding, and fire control. Adding to this also modernization of the drive system, of the armor (e.g., use of reactive armor plates) will substantially enhance the combat capability of the T-72 tank.

Modernization of the Fire Control System: what is possible?

Most proposals regarding modernization of the fire control system involve significant changes in the turret structure. For a customer in a hurry such changes pose a serious problem, because they require factory rework.

The TIGER FCS was developed especially for T-72 tanks and, therefore, its installation requires only very small modifications of the turret and its electrical system. They can be modified within a short time in situ rather than in the factory (practicably unit by unit).

TIGER FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS

After its installation in T-72 tanks the TIGER FCS consists of the following components

- GS-72T gunner's observation-sighting set stabilized in two planes. Includes a set of optics, a laser rangefinder, and an thermal imaging device. Facilitates destruction of targets in daytime and detection of masked targets.
- CS-65N commander's panoramic observation set stabilized in two planes. Includes optical components and passive (third generation) elements facilitating observation under conditions of limited visibility. Enables the commander to observe the battle field over the full 360° range during night and day.

Use of a computer in this FCS has lightened the operator's work load, inasmuch as all corrections are entered automatically. It has also shortened the time for opening effective fire. The several ways to achieve this included letting the computer control the automatic loading mechanism as well and increasing the speed of turret revolution as much as possible.

With the aid of an installed TIGER FCS, the commander can now independently detect, identify, and track targets throughout the full 360° range while the gunner is destroying other targets. The commander can, moreover, direct the gunner to a new target after the previous one has been destroyed.

The gunner's observation-sighting set includes control devices, an electronic module, and an opto-mechanical module, also an LE-72 laser rangefinder with the entire daytime channel and a TS-72 thermal imaging device.

The GS-72T set enables the gunner to observe, detect, and identify targets, also laying the main weapons during daytime operations. It includes, among others, a mirror stabilized by a gyroscope in two planes (sight line stabilized in both horizontal and vertical planes), a telescopic daytime sight with x8 magnification, a YAG:Nd laser rangefinder, and a TS-72 thermal imaging device with two operating ranges.


- A periscope is used with x1 magnification (wide observation field) for detection of targets and with x8 magnification (narrow observation field) for identifying a target, measuring the distance to it, and firing.
- A special grid is used for range measurement in the AUTOMATIC mode. It is also helpful in entering EMERGENCY MANUAL FIRING data. The mechanical coupling between sight line and gun tube operates in the EMERGENCY mode. The gunner

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During action the commander uses his panel with indicators, control devices, control panel for laying the sight line in two planes, set of switches, periscope with the ocular, and regulators of the optical system. The CS-65N is shock-proof, vibration-proof, immune to change of ambient conditions, and requires little if any maintenance.


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View of Gunner's Post




Key: 1- fire control panel, 2- gunner's observation-sighting set panel, 3- nighttime thermal imaging channel, 4- periscope, 5- thermal imaging control panel, 6- gunner's monitor, 7- daytime channel with laser rangefinder, 8- gunner's panel, 9- laser rangefinder control panel

View of Gunner's Post with Nighttime Channel (GS-72T)



Key: 1- fire control panel, 2- gunner's observation-sighting set panel, 3- nighttime channel, 4- epidiascope, 5- laser rangefinder control panel, 6- gunner's monitor, 7- daytime channel with laser rangefinder, 8- gunner's panel, 9- laser rangefinder control panel


Schematic Block Diagram of Gunner's Instrumentation



Schemat blokowy przyrządu działonowego

Key: -1. stabilized head, -2. nighttime (thermal imaging) channel, -3. electronic modules of thermal imaging device, -4. video output to commander's monitor, -5. daytime channel with laser rangefinder, -6. power supply for GS-72T set, -7. control panel, -8. ocular of daytime channel with laser rangefinder, -9. control module of GS-72T set, -11. gunner's control panel, -12. thermal imaging monitor

Schematic Block Diagram of Commander's Instrumentation



Schemat blokowy przyrządu dowódcy

Key: -1. video input to commander's monitor, -2. power distributor set interface, -3. FCS computer interface, -4. power supply for CS-65N set, -5. nighttime channel operation controls (LLTV), -6. daytime channel operation controls, -7. FCS interface, -8. stabilized x10 and x3 intensifier head, -9. ocular with segmental (6x2) projectors, -10. video monitor with binocular

View of Commander's Post



Widok stanowiska dowódcy. 1 — pulpit główny; 2 — przyrząd obserwacyjny dowódcy; 3 — periskopy; 4 — pulpit przyrządu obserwacyjnego; 5 — pulpit SKO; 6 — monitor dowódcy

1- main panel, 2- commander's observation set, 3- periscopes, 4- observation set panel, 5- FCS panel, 6- commander's monitor

SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION

Gunner's Instruments

The conventional gunner's instruments (TPDK-1 and the TPN1-49-23 nighttime sight) are replaced by the single GS-72T, the latter having been stabilized in two planes. This set is designed to fit the already existing hole in the turret, in which was previously mounted the nighttime observation set. A compact housing contains the thermal imaging device, the laser rangefinder, and the daytime channel.

Tank Commander's Instruments

The commander's tower and instruments have been replaced with an upper story permanently adjoining the tank turret and containing the panoramic observation set, the latter having been stabilized in two planes. Inside this observation set can be mounted a second-generation or third-generation image enhancer, which will enable the commander to act during nighttime as well. The commander's post has been additionally equipped with two periscopes.

Ballistic Counter

A high-speed digital counter is used for the necessary computation of ballistic variables during the firing

action. This lightens the commander's and the gunner's work load so that both can concentrate on performing their essential tasks (detection and destruction of targets) rather than on attending to the system.

Automatic Loading Mechanism

The operation of this component is supervised by a microprocessor, which shortens the ammunition pickup and delivery time. This is extraordinarily important, inasmuch as one absolutely needs to shorten the time in which the crew of a T-series tank will open fire.

Antiaircraft Gun

The gun can be steered electrically from the commander's post. This makes it possible to fire at targets in the air or on the ground. This action does not depend on the actual position of the tank turret and is conducted from the inside of the tank (with hatchways closed).

Response Time

The aim of engineers was to automate as many activities as possible and to thus minimize the time needed for opening fire. Use of the commander's panoramic observation instrument has contributed to this. Minimizing the response time had been one of the basic project goals.

Feasibility of 24 hour Operation

It has been assumed that T-series tanks require most modern instruments for nighttime observation. This enables the crew to detect and destroy targets day and night, also under adverse weather conditions. Such an arrangement also minimizes the probability of incurring heavy losses during nighttime combat, losses attributable to possession of obsolete observation instruments which cannot detect an approaching enemy object under the cover of the nighttime darkness.

TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF COMPONENTS: FCS COMPUTER

*Automatically entered data	
atmospheric pressure	600-1240 mbar
target velocity	up to 150 km/h
distance	300-9990 (+/- 5 m)
gun elevation angle	-15° to +25° (1°)
deflection	+/-15° (1°)
air temperature	-40°C to +60°C (+/-2°C)
load temperature	-40°C to +60°C (+/-2°C)
transverse component of wind velocity	40 m/s to +40 m/s +/-2 m/s
turret position	nX360
*Manually entered data	
distance	0-9990 m +/-10 m
air temperature	-40°C to +60°C (+/-1°C)
transverse component of wind velocity	40 m/s to +40 m/s (+/-2 m/s)
type of missile	APFSDS, HE, HEAT HESH MG
*Technical characteristics	
precision of calculated correction	0.1 mrad
time for recalculating correction	10 ms
data flow in real time	?

METEOROLOGICAL SENSOR

transverse and longitudinal wind velocity components	-20 m/s to +20 m/s (+/-2 m/s)
atmospheric pressure	750-1200 mbar (+/-50 mbar)
air temperature	-20°C to +55°C (+/-2°C)

SENSOR OF INCLINATION OF GUN CHOKES' AXIS

measurement range	-30° to +30° (+/-0.1°)
response time	100 ms
bandwidth	2 Hz
attenuation	0.5-0.7

CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT CONTROL PANELS

***COMMANDER'S CONTROL PANEL**-selection of operating mode -mode of FCS operation -mode of automatic loading mechanism operation -on/off switching of stabilization system -taking over weaponry homing control

***GUNNER'S CONTROL PANEL** -selection of operating mode -wind velocity entered manually -selection of missile type -takeover of weapon homing control

***CONTROL PANEL FOR CONTROL OF AUTOMATIC LOADING MECHANISM** -microprocessor -semiautomatic loading

GUNNER'S GS-72T SET

operating range in vertical plane	-15° to +25°
operating range in horizontal plane	±7.3°
field of view daytime channel with laser rangefinder	±8.6-25°
nighttime channel	±8.7-20°
accuracy of stabilization	< 0.1 mrad (standard deviation)
error of position sensors	< 0.15 mrad (standard deviation)
possibility of adapting focal length of ocular to gunner's sight	
filter protecting against 1064 nm laser radiation	
continuous display of basic data (distance, system operation mode) in ocular	
mechanical restraining of functions	

TS-72 THERMAL IMAGING DEVICE

wavelength	8-12 μm
field of view matrix	3.3°x2.3°
field of view angle	8°5.5'
polarity contrast	color selection between white and
ballistic grid (scale of sight angles)	black (corresponding to hot and lateral advance angles)
life	> 500 h
sensor resolution	60 or 120

NE72 IMAGE ENHANCER

second generation	
ballistic grid	
accuracy of coaxial alignment (in both planes)	±3.5 mrad
focal length	50 m to ∞
depth sharpness selection	-4 D to +2 D
F-stop	1.6
magnification	7-12x
field of view	7.2°

LE-72 DAYTIME CHANNEL WITH LASER RANGEFINDER

Ballistic grid

YAG:Nd laser rangefinder

— maximum range	9995 m
— minimum range	200 m
— precision	5 m
— selection of first and last target	
— repetition rate of measurements	every 1 s
— divergence of laser beam	> 1 mrad
— resolution	resolves two targets > 50 m apart

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LE-72 DAYTIME CHANNEL WITH LASER RANGEFINDER (Continued)

—focus sharpness selection	-4 D to +2 D
—focal length	to ∞ (recommended 1200 m)
—field of view	6.25°
—magnification	8x

COMMANDER'S CS-65N SET

-operating range in vertical plane	-15° to +45°
-operating range in horizontal plane	continuous (nX360°)
-field of view	3x16°
(selection by means of electronic switch)	$\pm 10.5^\circ$
-accuracy of stabilization	more than 0.1 mrad (standard deviation) in moving tank
-accuracy of sensors	0.15 mrad (standard deviation)
-focus sharpness selection	-5 D to +2 D
-filter shielding against	1064 nm laser radiation
-luminous display of basic data (distance, system operation mode) in ocular	
-image enhancer	
-ballistic grid	
-possibility of coupling commander's sight line to driver's post	

COMMANDER CUPPOLA

-hatchway can be raised and rotated	
-field of view	
three periscopes in front	180°
three periscopes in back	180°
-fixed (considering use of rotatable head)	
-possibility of activating antiaircraft machine gun from inside of tank	
-use of conventional periscopes	
-structure adapted to existing turret aperture	

DESIGN OBJECTIVES

The main objectives in designing the system were higher precision than that of the one now in use, higher probability of hitting a target with the first missile, and minimum time needed for opening fire. The time interval between two successive shots should also be shorter. These goals have been attained by use of stabilized observation-sighting instruments. The sight line has thus become independent of the gun axis so that the weapon can be homed without attendant perturbation of the sight line. The computer can then make the necessary corrections with greater precision in both vertical and horizontal planes while the gunner tracks the target very precisely and without difficulties. In other words, the gunner's tasks have been reduced to tracking a target, determining its distance (by means of the laser rangefinder), and delivering a shot. The gunner performs all these tasks without turning away from the ocular and a second shot will not be needed. The time taken for delivery of the first shot is shortened by several means. First of all, use of stabilized instruments in the commander's post lets the gunner of the crew destroy a target while the commander seeks out and tracks the next one. While the

gunner destroys a target, the commander takes over the gun homing control (by pressing a knob on the handle). The principal weapon is then being layed in the commander's sight line. Upon recognizing the thus indicated next target, the gunner now takes over the homing control so that the commander can resume seeking out the next target. Secondly, because the instruments of both the commander and the gunner are stabilized, the computer can make calculations and enter corrections not only much faster but also more precisely than is done in conventional T-series tanks. Furthermore, control of the automatic loading mechanism has been assigned to computer and other new techniques have been added. The most important of them is earlier selection of the missile type (preselection). This saves more time in one cycle than does the conventional system: 3-12 seconds more depending, among others, on the missile location in the rotating conveyor. When the target is not hit by the first missile, then the time saved for delivering the second shot can be the decisive factor influencing the number of battle casualties. Time saving thus contributes to combat superiority.

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The new system also includes emergency equipment. Operation in the EMERGENCY mode makes possible laying the gun and delivering shots from the gunner's position without computer participation. The same applies to the commander's instruments, the only difference being that the gun's axis is then layed toward the commander's sight line after the commander has taken over. Shots can also then be delivered without prior calculations. It is noteworthy that prior to opening fire in this mode of operation the gun need not be positioned with its axis within the coincidence window but rather within the safety window. The latter window is wider, and anyway always wider than narrowest field of view.

POSSIBILITIES OF FURTHER MODERNIZATION

The following components not in use now can be added to the TIGER system:

- Automatic tracking set makes possible more accurate and smoother target tracking without the operator's intervention. Decreases the crew's work load and increases the probability of striking the target with the first missile. Can be used, for instance, against slowly descending airborne targets (but only with appropriate ammunition developed for this purpose). ?? -Tank illumination sensors with laser beam warns the crew that the distance to their vehicle is being measured. It is possible to determine the direction from which their vehicle is being illuminated so that the commander can quickly estimate the magnitude of the danger.
- Entirely electrical gun steering set increases the gun homing speed and also shortens the response time in critical situations (thus improves the chances of survival). In such a situation its use is also expected to improve the quality of weapon stabilization and to increase the probability of a hit by the first missile.
- A modern intercom system for information exchange among tanks can also be installed, but its is whether installing such a system in T-series tanks would be worthwhile. Such systems are helpful in determining the enemy's position as well as one's own, also in indicating targets to the artillery, to aircraft, or to other vehicles. Under limited visibility (bad weather, smoke, dust, sand) they decrease the probability of hitting friendly vehicles.

Summing up, use of the TIGER FCS in T-series tanks offers the following advantages:

- higher probability of a hit by first missile;
- more effective firing in motion
- decisively better combat capability at nighttime and in bad weather;
- shorter response time in both emergency and basic modes of operation;
- stabilization of commander's observation set in two planes;

- stabilization of gunner's observation-sighting set;
- possibility of letting a number of customers know about modern technologies (except strategic technologies)

NAVAL FORCES

Naval 1st Deputy CINC Adm Fleet Kasatonov Interviewed

94UM0527B Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian
No 28, 2 Aug 94 [Signed to press 26 Jul 94] p 2

[Interview with Naval First Deputy CINC Fleet Admiral Kasatonov by ROSSIYA correspondent Eduard Lunev on the occasion of Navy Day: "Partitioning the Fleet Same as Partitioning the Future"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Lunev] Igor Vladimirovich, what is the condition of the Russian Fleet?

[Kasatonov] All four fleets, the Leningrad base, and the Caspian Sea Flotilla are carrying out their assigned missions and involved in summer training. Last year was a difficult one. We were refining the details to make the change to the two-year enlistment period and working on improving the contract service arrangement.

[Lunev] Are there many contract service personnel?

[Kasatonov] Something on the order of 10,000 to 12,000 in the entire fleet. But the quotas are constantly increasing. We are taking in youths from various member countries of the CIS.

[Lunev] Which areas are supplying the most enrolles to Naval schools?

[Kasatonov] The central regions and north-western part of Russia. They come mostly from families of intelligentsia; many are children and grandchildren of officers. This year there were considerably fewer cadets failing to graduate and become commissioned officers. The Navy, as before, attracts those persons who wish to continue our glorious Naval traditions and see the world. For example, this year at the graduating ceremony of the School imeni Makarov I awarded seven gold medals; 15 officers graduated with honors, and one officer defended a dissertation written in English involving two specialties.

[Lunev] Which ship is presently the best in the fleet?

[Kasatonov] I would say the large antisubmarine vessel "Admiral Vinogradov" of the Pacific Ocean Fleet and the submarine "K."

[Lunev] It is a fact that what renders a ship good is not only the shipbuilders, but also those who serve aboard her.

[Kasatonov] That is so. Without sailors, a ship will remain at the base. It is true that today's draftees are sometimes far below the requirements imposed by sea service, but a man of average abilities and physical

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fitness can successfully perform in the Navy. For example, out of 500 draftees, we had to place 120 of them into hospital for being underweight. They are treated there for one month as they would be in a sanatorium, eating and sleeping, and only then permitted to board a ship.

[Lunev] How do you think the Black Sea Fleet's problems will be resolved?

[Kasatonov] I am surprised at the attitude taken by those politicians and military persons who quite facetiously have come to use the term "separation of the fleet." Separation of the fleet means separation of the future. Russia is making no preparations for a war with Ukraine and will not fight her. It is clear to everyone that if the fleet is separated, the part in Russia and that in Ukraine will come to ruin. Clearly, the fleet's integrity must be preserved.

[Lunev] Igor Vladimirovich, the 300th Anniversary of the Russian Navy is not very far off in the future. Is progress being made in preparing for the celebration?

[Kasatonov] The Naval Center, which is involved in preparing for the holiday, recently defended a program costing two billion. That is what the celebration will cost. However, I do believe that it is worth it.

We plan to hold the festivities on the Neva River. We will invite ships from all fleets and representatives of the anti-Hitler coalition. Also participating in the celebration will be civilian and fishing vessels. Substantial engineering work is under way, since the celebration will take place in winter. The writer Viktor Konetskiy, as honorary chairman, will head the public council.

[Lunev] What is the prevailing mood now that the traditional holiday is on the way?

[Kasatonov] The celebration will not be one of unbridled joy, since there are many problems. Nonetheless, Naval personnel are confident that our people will be celebrating the 400th Anniversary of the Russian Fleet, being that the Navy, the same as Russia, is eternal.

Leningrad Naval Base Commander Grishanov Interviewed

944F1141B St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian
30 Jul 94 p 4

[Interview with Vice-Admiral Vladimir Grishanov, senior naval commander, conducted by SMENA correspondent Nikolay Kudryavtsev: "The Fleet Is in Need of Reform, Not Rebirth"]

[Text] In one of his program speeches to the Duma, Petr Stolypin, explaining his interpretation of the forms of protection of long-term national interests of the state, concluded: "A fleet is a necessary accessory of any great power which has a sea." Considering the fact that even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to have the longest maritime boundaries in the

world—around 38,000 kilometers, Stolypin's formulation has not lost and will never lose, its current nature.

Our first strategically significant naval force became the Baltic Fleet, which was founded by Peter the Great at the same time as Petersburg. The wharfs and educational institutions of our city were the starting points for the most powerful combat ships and their crews. Therefore, the Leningrad Military-Naval Base (LenVMB) is rightly considered to be the oldest.

On the eve of the Day of the VME [Military-Naval Fleet], the commander of the LenVMB—Senior Naval Commander and Vice Admiral Vladimir Grishanov, answered questions posed to him by our SMENA correspondent:

[Correspondent] Vladimir Vasilyevich! In recent times, practically everyone, from politicians to stars of the stage, is speaking out in favor of "rebirth of the fleet." One gets the impression that it has just experienced a crushing defeat in the Crimean War or in the Tsusimskiy battle.

[Grishanov] On one hand, I am sincerely pleased about the emergence of this interest and the concern over the fate of our country's fleet on the part of anyone who expresses it. However, I can hardly agree with the term "rebirth," which has been put into use by those who are clearly non-professionals. A typical substitution of concepts is taking place here. After all, all the units, ships, naval aviation, etc. created in the USSR by 1991 have been retained and are still active. With what degree of success, that is another question... So that we must speak here not about some mythical "rebirth," but about a deep reformation and reduction of the already existing structures.

[Correspondent] But, undoubtedly, for such reformation it is necessary to have a program which has been substantiated from a scientific and material-technical standpoint, and which has been thoroughly worked out for many years in advance. Does such a program exist?

[Grishanov] Naturally! And its developers (and these were military men, specialists of NII [scientific-research institutes], KB [design bureaus] and plants in the shipbuilding industry, associates of the president's administration and of the foreign policy, finance and economic departments, people's deputies and many many others) tried to objectively consider the realities which had been formulated within the country as well as in international policy. Two basic principles were taken as the cornerstone of this program. First of all, the "necessity and adequacy" of the combat capacities of the fleet as one of the component parts of the Armed Forces as a whole (if we speak in card terminology, in this case we must allow neither an "under draw" nor an "over draw"). Secondly, the quantitative and qualitative make-up of the naval units, associations and groupings, their armaments, base locations, supply and repair facilities must be maximally balanced and unified in accordance with the latest ideas of world military science.

Alas, this principle was declared in our country since the 60's, but was almost not realized in practical application. As a result, Russia has received a heavy legacy in the form of a fleet second in size to that of the USA, but not provided with normal conditions of basing and repair. Moreover, a considerable portion of the fixed capital has become outdated and physically worn. Questions of utilization of atomic submarines which have outlived their service life and of nuclear waste have been left unresolved. There are not enough funds for dismantling of even conventional ships and vessels which have been decommissioned! There has been a lagging behind in individual, supposedly "non-basic" classes of ships and types of weapons, without which the effectiveness of the current fleet, nevertheless, is notably reduced. In general, we have more than enough headaches.

[Correspondent] Opinions are often expressed today regarding the strictly continental fate of Russia, for which a fleet is an excess luxury, a "tsar's whim." In other words, the so-called "dry land party", which traces its genealogy all the way back to pre-Petrine times, is once again trying to influence society.

[Grishanov] I am well aware of such lobby discussions in certain circles. We may find a particular abundance of such discussions in the Western press, which is not surprising. However, I am entirely confident that such "parties," which are not very familiar with the much-suffering Russian history of the pacifists "stitching the boots of the Pirozhnikovs" will never gain any real influence among the people, and particularly among the country's leadership.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Vasilyevich, I simply cannot overlook one rather delicate question. What the attitude of the sailors, especially the veterans, to the replacement of the flag of the USSR Naval Fleet with the Andreyevskiy banner?

[Grishanov] Undoubtedly, with an understanding of the righteousness this historic act. After all, under the Andreyevskiy banner, Russians won many great victories over the course of two centuries, and made an entire series of geographical discoveries of world significance. This flag became the legitimate symbol of centuries-old traditions of our fleet!

But the same is true in sufficient degree also of the Soviet naval flag, which was reddened with the blood of the participants in the Great Patriotic War. It surely must take its respected place in the museums, works of art, or on memorial symbols.

[Correspondent] Other most notable indicators of military reform are the universal introduction of service by contract and the introduction of a new uniform. What is your opinion about this?

[Grishanov] In general, positive. Everything in the world flows, everything changes... It is true, the contract system has been practiced in the fleet for a long time now. In

important ship's positions, at the head of combat units we have always had professionals: Officers, warrant officers, or petty officers for the enlisted men. The contract conditions which are being introduced make it possible to significantly expand their contingents. It is true, ordinary draftees will also have much to do on the ships as well as in the shore-based units of the Naval Fleet.

As for the uniform, the fashion designers, luckily, have been able to capture the naval preference for healthy conservatism. As a result, unlike the Army men, the changes in the external appearance of our officers and sailors are difficult to spot for the casual observer. Although there were quite a few such changes.

[Correspondent] One way or the other, the questions of high policy and strategy are resolved in the capital. Therefore, let us turn to a topic which is closer to you. Tell us, please, about the primary tasks facing the LenVMB today.

[Grishanov] They are rather varied and complex. This is conditioned by the fact that our wonderful city—"the window to Europe"—remains and, I believe, will always remain the naval center of Russia.

And so, first of all, we are charged with the responsibility for the security of the Russian part of the Gulf of Finland, Lakes Ladoga, Onega and Chudo, and the navigable riverways of the North European region. An important task is the provision for construction of new and repair of existing ships and vessels, including the performance of operational and state experimental testing, as well as the training of crews. On the other hand, the base is responsible for tens of institutions and units of the VMF of central subordination: VUZes [higher educational institutions], the academy, advanced officers' classes, the Nakhimovskiy School, the NIIs, the central military-naval archives and library, the military departments of civilian institutes, etc. All of them are subordinate in the operative plan to Moscow. However, the resolution of various questions which arise on a day-to-day basis in regard to their administrative-management activity, housing, commandant's service, interaction with subdivisions of the Leningrad Military District and city authorities, etc. is placed upon the commander of the LenVMB—the senior naval commander.

The make-up of the LenVMB includes extensive Russian oceanographic and educational detachments. The former provides for the performance of oceanographic scientific and applied research in any region of the World Ocean in the interests of the VMB and civilian organizations, including foreign ones. The ships and educational centers of the latter provide instruction and naval practice for the midshipmen of most of the naval academies and future junior specialists. Our honorary responsibility also includes the organization of parades of combat ships along the Neva on days of certain state holidays, and the maintenance of a number of naval

monuments and memorial complexes in proper order, primarily the Central Museum of the VMF and ship No 1—the cruiser "Aurora". I might add that we, sailors, have a very high appraisal of the quality of work of the St. Petersburg shipbuilders in the capital repair of the cruiser.

As for the central museum, the exchange building is clearly unsuitable for it. Its planning makes it possible to demonstrate to visitors only a small part of the available collections. From 1709 through 1939 the museum was housed directly in the Admiralty building. That is its historical place! The exchange, on the other hand, must belong to those for whom it was built. As they say—"Give to God what is his, and to Caesar—what is Caesar!" Therefore, after development of a number of organizational plans for vacating the necessary space in our building (and there is more than enough of it), the mutually beneficial exchange of apartments, I am sure, will take place sooner or later.

[Correspondent] What role is the LenVMF playing in preparations for celebrating the 300th Anniversary of the Russian Fleet?

[Grishanov] It is participating most directly! We are taking a share participation in the implementation of an entire series of projects. We are speaking of building new monumental complexes in honor of the Russian naval glory, specifically a monument commemorating the 300th anniversary of the fleet and the hero submariner Marinesko. The entire collective of our specialists, in conjunction with scientist historians and associates of the archives, expect to prepare and publish by 1996 the most complete martyrology of Russian naval heroes who gave their lives in service to the Homeland in the 18-20th centuries. A restored submarine-museum of the "Dekabrist" type, which participated in the Great Patriotic War, has been placed permanently on Vasilyevskiy Island and is being prepared to receive its first visitors. Perhaps there will also be other memorial ships. For example, the icebreaker "Krasik," the twin of the legendary Makarov's "Yermak." There are hopes to create a special museum of history of naval weapons in our city. We also have many other plans aimed at raising the sense of national pride in our fleet among Russia's residents, and especially among the young people. However, the difficulties in these endeavors are common knowledge—the extreme instability of budget financing, the bureaucratic red tape, etc. Although we do expect to get considerable help also from various sponsors. I have no doubt that every serious entrepreneur understands very well the importance of the VMF in ensuring the security of our maritime trade communications, ports and economic off-shore zones.

[Correspondent] In conclusion, let me ask the most banal question. Who occupied this overstated, splendid office before you? Has the portrait of Peter I always hung over your chair?

[Grishanov] After the current admiralty building was built, the apartments of the naval ministers of Russia

were housed here, beginning with the first one. These were Admirals N. S. Mordvinov, N. P. Chichagov, F. P. Vranghel and I. K. Grigorovich.

During Soviet times (from 1939 through 1947), the office was occupied by the twice commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, holder of the Order of Ushakov No 1, Admiral V. F. Tributs. This is the permanent work place of all the commanders of the LenVMB—the senior naval commanders.

As for the portrait of Peter I, it is of contemporary work (although the frame is old), and appeared over my chair only in 1992. I believe I do not need to explain whose portraits hung in this spot earlier...

[Correspondent] Comrade vice-admiral! SMENA congratulates you personally, as well as all military naval men, with the Day of the Military-Naval Fleet!

[Grishanov] Thank you! I too, in turn, congratulate those who have in one way or another tied their fates with the fleet—the personnel, scientists and engineer-shipbuilders, the workers, and especially the veterans.

Commander of Paldiski Naval Garrison Interviewed

MM2707125594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Jul 94 p 3

[Report by Leonid Levitskiy incorporating interview with Rear Admiral Aleksandr Olkhovikov, commander of Paldiski Naval Garrison in Estonia; date, place not specified: "Military Base in Paldiski Ceases To Exist. Estonians Themselves Are Impeding Export of Enriched Uranium"]

[Text] Tallinn—Paldiski was 276 years old 18 July. Few people in Russia have ever heard of this city, which has existed on the world's naval charts for two-and-a-half centuries now. This is "Peter's second city," a city born of the Russian Navy. Now the name "Paldiski" has moved from the military charts onto the pages of European newspapers. Many alarming chords are being struck in the commentaries about it. A comparison has even been made—"northern Chernobyl."

Only recently, Paldiski was the training center for nuclear submarine crews. Here, the missile carrier collectives familiarized themselves with, studied, and mastered warfare, victory, and survival. They waged war by computer. Everything else, as on a submarine on patrol [podvodnyy kreyser], was real, including the power plants—two genuine nuclear reactors. The fleet is leaving Estonia, Paldiski, and it is also taking its property with it. The time has come to remove the nuclear installations—this indeed frightens Europe: Just suppose "the northern Chernobyl began to speak." At this troubled time, with the discordant relations between Estonia and Russia, the dismantling of the nuclear reactors is causing apprehension. An international committee of experts has been set up. In the words of Foreign Minister

Juri Luik, \$10 million are required. Five million have already been handed over to Estonia by the West—the largest contribution was made by America. President Bill Clinton has promised a further \$2 million. So Paldiski's problem, unlike many others, is not so much with the money or the technical capabilities as in the desire and ability of Estonia and Russia to reach agreement.

The city is located 46 km from Tallinn on the shore of Paldiski Bay. During the Northern War, Peter I conquered or redeemed from the Swedes a huge Baltic coastline. It is here that, in July 1715, the Russian emperor decided to construct a "harbor for warships." On 18 July 1718 Peter I laid the foundations of the jetty, harbor, and fortress.

Paldiski's most recent commandant and architect is Rear Admiral Aleksandr Olkhovikov. Hero of the Soviet Union Olkhovikov was the first commander of the first Soviet nuclear submarine. In it, Olkhovikov spent time at both poles—or underneath them.

Aleksandr Vasilyevich is chief of the Paldiski Garrison, chief of the training center, and a participant in the talks between Russia and Estonia on the problem of the reactors.

What goes on at the training center?

"The center where nuclear submarine crews were trained no longer exists. The last 'trainee' left two years ago. A small collective of specialists is engaged in dismantling and removing the equipment. Everything is being done in line with the republic's laws."

"Do the reactors represent a real threat to Estonia, or Europe?"

"Both reactors have been made safe, and the procedure for their maintenance is rigidly defined. Training for their dismantling is in progress. Provided there is no interference and provided there are no obstacles to compliance with the servicing and maintenance procedures, we guarantee complete safety."

"What obstacles do you have in mind?"

"Once, an Estonian light aircraft sought to fly over the nuclear center. Had it met with an accident, the whole of Europe would have remembered this for a long time."

"The Estonian Government has already named a deadline for removal of the nuclear fuel."

"The Russian side has not mentioned any deadlines. Technically we are ready to complete the most complex operation—to extract the nuclear fuel."

"The special government representative in Paldiski, Juri Tikk, told the press that special container ships for nuclear materials have arrived in Paldiski. In his words, you have promised to hand over the center's premises and other facilities to the Estonian authorities by 15 August, and to complete the removal of the nuclear fuel

by 31 August. He believes 30 days is enough time to unseal the reactor and get at it."

"Things are simpler for Mr. Tikk—he is not answerable for anything. I, unfortunately, cannot as yet talk about deadlines. They must be determined by interstate agreement—which Estonia is refusing to sign."

"Is the actual operation to discharge the reactor and extract the fuel dangerous? Has it been thoroughly rehearsed in the Russian Navy?"

"Down to the last detail. Scaremongering in respect of Paldiski is completely unjustified."

"We, Russian specialists, will carry out the operation to discharge the reactor. There has long been a special team in the fleet to carry out this operation. It will come to Paldiski at the requisite moment. We promised to complete our work within a year of the removal of the fuel."

"Do foreign experts agree with the deadlines you have named?"

"A group of experts—or consultants, rather—has been formed from representatives of several countries. I met with its members recently in Sweden. Their job is one of consultation if required, and not of monitoring the work, or directing it. The total decommissioning of nuclear installations is a lengthy process. Only people who know the equipment inside out can do this work. We have everything: experienced personnel, the necessary mechanisms and technologies, and each operation and interaction has been polished to perfection."

"In order to ensure the successful completion of a very difficult job we now need just one thing—a good, keen attitude on the part of the Estonian side. And this was present at first—the republic even repaired the section of railroad leading to Paldiski. Nor were there any comments on the program we submitted. Back in March, at the Estonian-Russian talks, the working groups on the Paldiski problem signed an agreement whose first point stated: 'The sides deem it necessary to prepare as soon as possible (by April 1994) an agreement between the Governments of the Estonian Republic and the Russian Federation on the procedure and deadlines for dismantling the nuclear reactors in the city of Paldiski.' It went on: 'The Russian side reported that work to discharge the spent nuclear fuel cannot legally begin prior to the conclusion of an agreement.'"

"It was only at the May round of talks that the Estonian delegation suddenly put forward a demand 'to place the nuclear power installations on the Pakri peninsula under the control of the Estonian Republic in the form of civilian facilities by 31 August 1994.'"

"What does Estonia want with these fairly dangerous reactors?"

"Prime Minister Mart Laar gave a firm promise: Not a single Russian soldier will remain on the territory of the republic. Well, even dressed in blue coveralls, we do not

fit into this scheme of things. Our specialists are, nevertheless, military people. Obviously, Estonian politicians feel the need to demonstrate their intractability."

"Is an agreement with Estonia really necessary?"

"An agreement is necessary: It will define the procedure, deadlines, volume of work, and the sides' responsibility for guaranteeing the security of this work. It is very important to maintain secrecy in respect of the manufacture of reactors and other equipment. Many technologies are still unique—they are Russian technologies, a commercial secret.

"The less politics there is around the nuclear reactors, the less we are told what to do, the quicker and more successfully we will withdraw them. I think this is what is expected of us by a Europe which fears a northern Chernobyl."

...At a news conference, Vaino Reinart, head of the Estonian delegation at the talks with Russia, accused Russia of violating the treaty on the removal of nuclear fuel. Admittedly, he did not back up his assertion. The stance of Academician Endel Lippmaa, a chemist and former USSR people's deputy, is a curious one. His image in Estonia is that of the man who forced Mikhail Gorbachev to condemn the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the secret protocols thereto. The academician is deemed a great expert on Russia. He is always the first on the scene whenever any slight crack in bilateral relations becomes apparent. It is for this type of inflexibility that the bloc of parties by the name of "Right-Wing Estonia," two years in advance of the republic presidential elections, proposes to make him the candidate of the Right. The academician is equally intransigent in the argument over Paldiski. The newspaper RAHVA HAAL expounded his view in detail. It is necessary, the academician believes, to use to Estonia's benefit the \$2 million for the reactors promised by Bill Clinton in Riga, as nuclear fuel rods are expensive in themselves and it makes no sense to pay Russia to remove them. It would be more useful to keep the rods in Estonia—they contain enriched uranium which can be sold. Under no circumstances should they conclude a treaty with Russia on dismantling the nuclear reactors. Along with such a treaty we will end up with an "Estonian Skrunda" [reference to former USSR radar station in Latvia which was bone of contention between Russia and Latvia prior to agreement defining Russia's rights of access and use], the academician claims. And Russian soldiers in civvy. Two million dollars is too little compensation for the humiliation which lies ahead....

Academician Lippmaa reflected the thrust of Estonian policy quite accurately: No treaties with Russia, and any compromises are to be made at the West's expense.

I will make it even more clear. According to Rear Adm. Aleksandr Olkhovikov, all the preparatory work for dismantling and removing the reactors is being conducted by the fleet—that is, Russia—at its own expense....

Report Cites Ways To Rehabilitate Russian Navy

MM0308172394 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Jul 94 p 2

[Letter (undated) based on material prepared for State Duma's Committee for Geopolitical Issues by working group of former naval officers, carried under rubric "Tomorrow Is Navy Day. An Unfeste Letter" and entitled: "Tsushima Awaits Us"—first six paragraphs are undated introductory letter to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Chief Editor V.V. Chikin from State Duma Deputy Academician K.N. Panferov, captain third rank, retired]

[Text] Esteemed Valentin Vasilyevich!

Concerned at the disastrous state of the Navy and the growth in the number of accidents and disasters involving personnel fatalities, the State Duma Committee for Geopolitical Issues has taken the lead in holding parliamentary hearings on the topic "On the Russian Navy, Its State and Prospects," scheduled initially for 26 July and postponed until October of this year.

In articles in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA ("Nets for Steel 'Sharks'" of 21 July 1994, and others) and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (frequently) the leaders of the Navy have been distorting the actual reality in the Navy and trying to mislead the country's public.

A working group of military experts from the Committee for Geopolitical Issues has prepared material on the real state of the Russian Navy and ways of reestablishing its war-fighting capability.

I ask that it be published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[signed] Academician K.N. Panferov, State Duma deputy, captain third rank, retired

After the disgrace of Tsushima—the defeat of the Russian Navy by the Japanese—Prime Minister of the Russian Empire P. Stolypin, speaking at a sitting of the State Duma 24 May 1908, stated without any hesitation that "Russia needs a Navy...a capable Navy meeting the standards of scientific requirements. If we do not have this, if Russia's Navy is different, then it will only be a liability." What did Stolypin propose to do for Russia? All questions of naval defense must be settled in connection with the defense of the whole state; then the naval department must be reorganized; the disorder in it and the abuses must be ended; the very spirit of the department must be renewed; and finally, a financial shipbuilding program must be presented for judgment by the legislative assembly, inasmuch as a new Navy cannot be built without a full shipbuilding program.

When analyzing the current state of the Russian Navy one is, unfortunately, led to state that in terms of all the negative positions expressed by Stolypin at the beginning of the century we too have made obvious mistakes and

miscalculations which have ultimately led us today, without any war, to a repetition of Tsushima.

Is a Russian Navy needed today? Undoubtedly so. Russia has been a great naval power in the past, it is a great naval power now, and it will be in the future, with 12 seas and three oceans and a maritime border twice the length of its land border (up to 40,000 km). A Navy is needed to ensure Russia's security from the direction of the seas and oceans, and for the protection of the borders, the Russian economic zone, and the continental shelf. The Navy is a constituent component of the nuclear triad which, under the Second Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms [START II], is to be entrusted with the main tasks of the country's strategic defense (if it is ratified).

It must be said straight out that the country's leadership has made a serious mistake in the "Basic Provisions of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine." One small paragraph has been devoted to the Navy, which gives the following instructions: "To step up dialogue relating to the preparation and adoption of effective international agreements in the sphere of reducing naval forces and armaments and limiting naval activity." And that is all there is about the Navy of a great naval power. This is not a military doctrine, nor even the basic principles of a military doctrine. This is a directive to eliminate the Navy.

A. Kokoshin, Russia's first deputy defense minister, essentially supports this program; he underestimates the place and role of the Navy in the system of the Russian Armed Forces. His statement to a correspondent of the *MORSKOY SBORNIK* journal (No. 11, 1993) generates particular concern: "I would not say that we have a new shipbuilding program in the traditional sense. It seems that there should be a program for the development of weapons as a whole, and the navy will be included as a component.... Traditionally, because of our geostrategic position, we are more of a land-based power than a naval power, and indeed Russia's fate has, as a rule, been resolved on land." This is brief and to the point: Russia is more of a land-based power than a naval power, no worthy place has been found for the Navy in Russia's military doctrine, and that is why there is no new shipbuilding program. Such arguments have frequently been used by Western politicians and military figures in the past, whereas this time it is Russia's first deputy defense minister—a former scientific associate at the Institute of the United States and Canada—who is saying this.

Meanwhile, we cannot ignore the fact that the nuclear missile shield built by the peoples of the USSR has played a positive role in averting nuclear war, and that the Navy has played a substantial role in the country's strategic defense. Nor can we ignore the fact that the main powers—the United States, Britain, and France—are not even dreaming of making any serious reductions to their naval forces. On the contrary, they are taking

every possible measure to remove naval forces and their separate important components (sea-launched cruise missiles, for example) from the negotiating process.

What kind of Navy does Russia have today?

The Russian Navy includes the following: 56 strategic missile-armed submarines, 486 surface ships (of which 72 are oceangoing), 166 multirole submarines (of which 89 are nuclear-powered), 310 variously tasked combatant craft, 950 auxiliary ships, 1,580 airplanes, and 566 helicopters. In terms of numbers, only one-third of Russian Navy ships are modern vessels. At least 70 percent will be taken out of commission in the next 10 years, and over 100 submarines and around 300 surface ships will be ready for salvage by the end of the 1990's. But that is not the main thing.

Russian missile-armed submarines and antiship submarines (hereinafter—nuclear submarines) have completely lost their main quality—stealth of operation. The noise level of Russian nuclear submarines, including those of the latest generation currently being built in Severodvinsk, is incomparably higher than that of their American counterparts, and the mutual detection distance for Russian and U.S. ASW submarines is 1:30—1:100 in the United States' favor. The Americans have attained the capability of detecting our submarines with a probability factor of 0.95 and are in a position to monitor over 75 percent of the area of strategically important regions of the world ocean. Any Russian submarine which enters the Atlantic Ocean beyond a line linking the Spitzbergen archipelago—Bear Islands—and Nordcapp (Norway), and the Pacific Ocean from Kamchatka and beyond the line of the Kuril Islands, is tracked with fairly high precision by ocean-floor acoustic tracking systems linked by cable to centers for the targeting and destruction [*navedeniye i unichtozheniye*] of submarines by U.S. ASW forces and resources. Russia has no analogous systems and will not have any in the foreseeable future.

At present, Russia's nuclear submarines have become floating targets, and they have lost the capability of solving not only strategic but also defensive tasks, even in coastal areas. Despite the literally heroic efforts of naval personnel to maintain at least some degree of combat readiness, we have only 15 percent of our nuclear submarines on alert duty, while the United States has more than 50 percent.

As a result of all the aforesaid, the combat service of all the Russian submarines in the ocean has become an absurdity insofar as Russia's nuclear submarines are constantly in the sights of U.S. and NATO ASW forces. But it is specifically to those nuclear submarines—a target costing trillions—that it is planned to move the center of gravity in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons (up to 60 percent), accompanied by the simultaneous destruction, under START II, of our heavy silo-based MIRVed ICBM's against which the United States has no reliable protection. There can be no doubt that breaking Russia's nuclear triad to the benefit of the

United States with the replacement of silo-based ICBM's by Topol-type missiles will not only cause irreversible damage to Russia's defense capability as a whole and increase the risk of accidents and disasters but will also ruin the country economically once and for all.

Surface warships are also in a difficult position. Their hydroacoustic armament is inferior to American counterparts in terms of mutual detection range by a factor of over 25. Russia's heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers (three heavy guided-missile cruisers, design 1143), which cost astronomical sums to build and are the Navy's main strike forces in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, are not battleworthy: There is no effective combat security for them; their antiship and antiair defense is poor, and the replacement of the carrier-based embarked aircraft (YAK-38 and YAK-41) is not provided for.... Our Navy's missile-armed strike aviation and ASW aircraft in the Northern and Pacific Fleets (TU-22K, TU-95, IL-38) are not battleworthy either, since they do not have any fighter cover or protection against SAM complexes, or any effective electronic warfare gear.

Among officers, discontent and feelings of hopelessness are growing, and these are being exacerbated by the difficult material position and lack of social protection for officers and their families, and, frequently, by the lack of housing. Officers are losing the desire to continue serving; many of them do not intend to conclude contracts and are seeking transfer ashore [uyti na bereg] or into the reserve.

The impression may be formed that the country's top-level leadership, which is responsible for its security, does not know the real situation in the Navy because of a lack of information. This is not the case, however.

The real state of affairs in the Navy has long been known to all naval officers, to the country's leadership, and to U.S. and NATO leaders, but little is known to the Russian people, that is, the taxpayer, from whom previous commanders in chief have hidden the true situation in the Navy. There is no doubt that the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense (P. Grachev) and the Navy (F. Gromov) are continuing this same negative policy. They are not capable of restoring the Russian Navy and telling the truth.

Are there ways of correcting this situation which is so difficult for the Navy? Yes, there really are ways to do this. What is primarily needed is:

—given the growing role of the Navy within the framework of the future implementation of START II (if it is ratified), as well as the contradictory views of the state of the Navy, for the purpose of carrying out a comprehensive inspection of the Navy it is necessary in the third quarter of 1994 to establish by edict of the country's president a special state commission incorporating State Duma deputies, naval specialists, and independent military experts, including admirals and officers of the reserve, interested in reestablishing a

battleworthy Russian Navy. On the basis of the results of the inspection and with the involvement of research institutes and educational establishments of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy, to prepare a report to the president and the State Duma not only about the actual state of the Navy but also about measures to reform it and restore combat readiness, the quantitative and qualitative manning level of the Navy, basing, a radical purge of personnel, and subsequent organizational development and utilization. As warranted, to hand over the inspection materials to the prosecutor's office to allow the guilty to be put on trial;

—to immediately revoke the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 1241-302 dated 30 October 1987, which still allows for the handing over (delivery and official acceptance) into service of ships and armament and military hardware [VVT] which do not meet contractual conditions as far as battleworthiness, reliability, and safety are concerned; to suspend the operation of ships and armament and military hardware which have been accepted with deviations from safety specifications and performance characteristics and are dangerous to their own crews until the implementation of essential measures reducing the risk of accidents and disasters; to ban transfers of warships and nuclear submarines to the reserve without the knowledge of the Russian Federation Government.

—to execute the decisions of the Navy Military-Technical Council of 28 August 1985 and 25 April 1986, previously revoked by former Navy Commander in Chief V. Chernavin, in terms of monitoring noise levels during state trials and introducing proposals aimed at lowering the noise levels of nuclear submarines with the minimum expenditure and as soon as possible;

—to halt production and delivery and acceptance of nonbattleworthy armament and military hardware (nuclear submarine targets, USET-80 torpedoes, and so on);

—in the interests of increasing the operating safety of armament and military hardware with due account of the new economic relations, to improve the system of armament and military hardware deliveries, and to set up a means of expert appraisal of projects in terms of "cost and effectiveness" which is independent of producers and clients, and a system for conducting trials of and taking official delivery of ships, armament, and military hardware, subordinating it via the Security Council to the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Russian Armed Forces; to draw up a new "Statute on Military Representatives of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense," having stipulated the organizational and material independence of military delivery and acceptance from subordinate enterprises for all types of allowances;

—by way of a mechanism for implementing the law "On Security" in the sphere of military activity, it is

essential to set up under the Russian Security Council a system of state organs to oversee and monitor the safety of military service with the involvement in their work of in-house organizations and independent military experts from among admirals and officers of the reserve;

—to complete in the third quarter of 1994 the investigation into the accident involving the Komsomolets nuclear submarine, taking due account of all factors and material evidence pertaining to the case;

—considering the actual state of Russian missile-carrying submarines and ASW submarines, to refrain from ratifying START II pending a full examination by the State Duma of all related issues and the holding of closed parliamentary hearings on this Treaty.

[Signed] Hero of the Soviet Union Admiral of the Fleet (Retired) G.M. Yegorov, former chief of the Naval Main Staff; Admiral (Retired) N.N. Amelko, former commander of the Pacific Fleet, Navy deputy Commander-in-Chief, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, candidate of naval sciences; Major General (Reserve) L.I. Shershnev, president of the National International Security Fund; Captain First Rank (Reserve) A.I. Khrapovich, former commander of a strategic nuclear missile submarine cruiser, chief of department in the Russian Federation Government apparatus; Captain First Rank (Retired) I.B. Kolton, former deputy commander of a division of strategic missile submarine cruisers, authorized representative of the Standing Commission for State Delivery and Acceptance of Navy Ships, sector chief in the Russian Federation Government Apparatus; Colonel (Reserve) P.G. Belov, independent expert on systems engineering safety, candidate of technical sciences; Captain First Rank A.A. Alekseyev, former chairman of the Committee for the Affairs of Servicemen and Members of Their Families under the Russian Federation president, chairman of the International Committee for the Rights of Servicemen and Members of Their Families; Captain Second Rank (Retired) G.M. Melkov, former diesel submarine commander, doctor of juridical sciences, professor at the Moscow State Juridical Academy; Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral (Retired) R.A. Golosov, former chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet, former chief of the department of operational art at the Navy General Staff Military Academy, candidate of military sciences, professor, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (geopolitics and security section); Hero of the Soviet Union Rear Admiral (Retired) L.M. Zhiltsov, commander of the first nuclear submarine to complete a voyage to the North Pole in 1962, former commander of a separate nuclear submarine brigade and senior authorized representative of the Standing Commission for State Delivery and Acceptance of Navy Ships; Rear Admiral (Reserve) A.S. Pushkin, former commander of a nuclear submarine division, candidate of naval sciences; Hero of the Soviet Union

Vice Admiral (Retired) Ye.D. Chernov, former commander of the first flotilla of nuclear submarines, former deputy chief of the Naval Academy, candidate of naval sciences.

Report Claims 'Total Lack of Interest' in Russia's Navy

MM0908135194 Moscow NTV in Russian
1700 GMT 31 Jul 94

[From the "Itogi" newscast: Video report from Severomorsk by Aleksandr Gerasimov, identified by caption]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted on Navy Day salute, quayside interviews with sailors returning from shore leave] [Gerasimov over footage of quayside, sailor painting ship, warships on the move, closeups of Typhoon class submarine] Paradoxically, the housing problem is one of the main factors why the Navy has not yet fallen apart. If people had somewhere to go, they would all be gone as a result of the poor conditions they have to endure—wages are not paid for months on end, food supplies are poor, power cuts and nonavailability of hot water are commonplace.

The fleet is rapidly ageing. Dents in the plating of the world's largest Typhoon class nuclear submarine no longer embarrass the crew. There is no money for repairs. At the same time, obvious matters which do not constitute a military secret are being kept from outsiders, that is if you can describe taxpayers as such. After all, it is their money that pays for the Army. We were not allowed to see inside the submarine or talk to the crew, despite an official permit from the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Nor were we able to establish to what extent this submarine, and those moored alongside, each carrying 20 nuclear missiles, are combat capable. Meanwhile, in private conversation officers spoke about constant malfunctions of systems, poor training of personnel, and incomplete equipment. One of the Typhoon class submarines is spending a second year in the stocks at the Severodvinsk Machine Building Plant waiting for repairs and modernization. No one knows how much longer this hulk will remain here. The fate of a number of submarines currently at the plant in various stages of finish is equally unknown. The order is being funded by the Ministry of Defense from budget appropriations. But the military are not getting the money. By the end of July only 10 percent of capital investments in beginning-of-the-year prices had been received. The Severodvinsk plant and thousands of its suppliers are at a standstill. "Sevmash" Plant Director David Pashayev believes that if this situation is allowed to persist for another year, Russia will lose its nuclear submarine fleet for good. [passage omitted on brief interview with Pashayev who says that despite promises, funds have not been made available]

[Gerasimov over video of bay, submarine, armored personnel carrier emerging from the hold of a ship] Under the military doctrine it is the Government of the

Russian Federation which is responsible for the state of the Armed Forces. It is not likely that the Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a decision to drastically reduce the nuclear submarine fleet which is a component of the strategic nuclear forces. No one is resolute enough to do this. Judging by appearances, relying on the disciplined conduct and conservatism of the military, the Ministry of Finance is trying to contain inflation by withholding payments from the defense section of the budget, forgetting that playing games with armed people is dangerous.

[Gerasimov to camera] And a final point. Even a fleeting analysis of the correlation between the components of Russia's Navy—the sailors, shipbuilders, and government structures—leads to the strange conclusion that there is a total lack of interest not just in developing but also in maintaining Russia's naval might. Aleksandr Gerasimov and Nikolay Fedorov reporting for NTV from the Northern Fleet. [video shows quayside, naval ships on the move, moored submarine, interior of "Sevmash" Plant, submarine in bay, armored personnel carrier emerging from hold of ship]

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Defense Road Construction Head Interviewed on Construction Progress

94UM0526A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jul 94 p 3

[Interview with Colonel-General Ivan Dmitriyevich Marchuk, chief of the Federal Road Construction Directorate under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, date, place and occasion not specified, by Petr Altunin. KRSNAYA ZVEZDA, under rubric "The Country's New Construction Sites": "One More Project of the Century": Chita-Khabarovsk Highway—Military Road Construction Personnel Have Begun Its Realization": photograph of Marchuk included]

[Text] Over the last few years Road Construction Troops have been working in remote areas of Russia, carrying out the "Non-Chernozem Zone Roads" state program. Then came a new piece of news: military road construction personnel are at the construction site of the Chita-Khabarovsk Far-Eastern route 2,295 km long. Questions immediately arise: Has everything already been finished in the Non-Chernozem Zone? How is the eastward charge of the "military construction assault force" to be explained? We addressed these and other questions to Colonel-General Ivan Marchuk, chief of the Federal Road Construction Directorate under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

[Marchuk] Despite difficult years for the country, military road construction personnel placed an overall 3,500 km of roads in the Non-Chernozem Zone into operation in five years and work continues there, albeit not at previous rates (because of a lack of financing). But lately, in connection with a reorganization of road construction units and their transfer to cost accounting, we went

beyond the Non-Chernozem Zone and unfolded road construction on all Russian territory. Initially they were shifted beyond the Urals; then, after drawing up a joint plan with the Mintrans [Ministry of Transport] Federal Highway Department and coordinating it with local authorities, we went to the government with this plan and that is how we "took hold of" the present Chita-Khabarovsk project. By the way, this project was under development from 1976, but gradually faded away. Small sections of road also were built here previously. Now we also must put these "kilometers" in order and, most important, ensure construction of the entire route. That task was assigned us by Russian Government Decree No 537 of 24 May of this year. The deadline is 2005. The average annual rate is 120 km.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] Ivan Dmitriyevich, you built an average of 600-700 km of roads in a year in the Non-Chernozem Zone, but here it is 120. More difficult sections?

[Marchuk] The difference is incommensurable. Building this road can be compared with the BAM [Baykal-Amur Main Railroad Line], where, by the way, I had occasion to work more than a single year. Along the route are cliffs to be drilled and blown, permafrost, mari [shallow, hummocky bogs] and rivers—Amur, Zeya, Bureya, Nercha. Roads in the Non-Chernozem Zone are of the 4th to 5th technical category, where we put in 10,000-15,000 cubic meters of soil per kilometer of route; here they are of the 3rd category with a transition to 2nd category, and 100,000 or more cubic meters of soil per kilometer must be put in. Two hundred fifty bridges will be built. True, we are bringing in specialized subcontracting organizations to do this work.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] What will be the width of the roadway bed?

[Marchuk] The width of asphalt will be 7 meters plus shoulders of 2.5 meters on both sides. The design traffic speed is 100 kilometers per hour.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] What is the importance of this road? Perhaps the country has matters of more importance today?

[Marchuk] Roads in Russia are our common misfortune. You know, it was the ancients who said: "Via ist vita"—A road is life... Will you find a developed country today where two such very large regions as our West and East are not linked by a highway, and in this century? The international port of Nakhodka also does not have a main outlet. It is even impossible to calculate how much we are losing here. And from a strategic, defense standpoint the situation does not stand up to criticism: if the railroad is cut (and it is at the very border), traffic stops. There also is the social aspect: just as many people, including former builders, already have settled the entire length of the BAM line—they are making taiga areas habitable—so here too new settlements will spring up on the future route.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Probably the most important and most topical question for today is, where are funds to be gotten under conditions of total deficit in the country?

[Marchuk] The government decree charges the Russian Ministry of Transport with allocating financial resources for building the route in amounts corresponding to its construction rates by years, and charges the Ministry of the Economy with supplying the Federal Road Construction Directorate with material-technical resources under the procedure accepted for the state defense order.

And still I wish to emphasize that with all this, the main calculation is on the extrabudgetary road fund formed in 1992. It is being formed basically from taxes on the sale of fuels and lubricants, excise taxes on the sale of passenger cars, and other revenue. The overall cost of the project is around R800 billion in current prices.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But won't this financing be "frustrated"?

[Marchuk] I do not believe so. A draft of the new wording of the Law on Road Funds in the Russian Federation was adopted in the first reading at a recent State Duma session; there it states that sources of their financing are fully preserved. We will hope that everything remains that way subsequently as well.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] From when are you beginning the count of the start of work?

[Marchuk] We took a certain risk here, albeit a substantiated one. We were sure there would be a government decree, and so as not to lose time, under an agreement with the Federal Highway Department we landed our "assault force" at future construction sites—in Magdagachi, Mogocha, Zhireken, Areda and other built-up areas—during August-October of last year. Ground reconnaissance parties under the direction of major-generals S. Khorebin and V. Kovshov settled all the details. In places disbanded military units transferred their barracks, housing, mess halls, schools and clubs to us, in places we bought apartments for officers, and local authorities also helped. Several road construction units previously subordinate to Glavvoenstroy [Main Military Construction Directorate] were transferred to us for reinforcement at new locations. We immediately set about to settle in and create a logistics base. As of today we have around 20 military posts, several training centers, asphalt concrete plants, railroad dead-end sidings, and quarries for production and processing of stone materials.

In this connection I would like to mention the names of Colonel Vladimir Morzhikov, Lieutenant-Colonel Yuriy Kosheparov and Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Lonskoy, who, having landed their "assault forces" and settled in, immediately led them "into battle," that is to say, into construction of the road.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How many people will be employed after coming to full strength?

[Marchuk] A total of around 10,000. Of them, around 30 percent will be first-term soldiers.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Ivan Dmitriyevich, that is forbidding taiga country. Still, how will you retain people and attract new ones?

[Marchuk] Not on enthusiasm alone, of course. The government decree suggests that we submit proposals on a system of state guarantees to organizations, workers and servicemen engaged in building the road, and we already prepared a packet of such proposals. Now it is being coordinated in the government.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Can you already tell about the first results today?

[Marchuk] Yes, they are there. This year we will turn over at least 60 km of route. Under the plan it will be 100 km next year and 135 km in 1996. Rates of pouring the earth bed presently have reached over 40,000 m³ per day.

I was just on site together with Anatoliy Pavlovich Nasonov, general director of the Russian Ministry of Transport's Federal Highway Department, and we saw with our own eyes that construction is in full swing and objective preconditions for its completion according to the outlined plan are in evidence.

PEACEKEEPING FORCES

General Nikolayev Reviews Problems of Russia's Borders

944F1112A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Natalya Pachegina: "The President and the Security Council Regard the Border Guards With Favor; the 'Green Caps' Are Ready To Comply"]

[Text]

The Border

The last meeting of the Security Council of the country, which was devoted to the question of the state border of Russia, focused close attention on the Federal Border Service and Andrey Nikolayev, its commander in chief. In only two days of meetings with journalists in the FBS [Federal Border Service] press center and on trips to the Northwestern Border District with a group of military attaches, the elegant colonel general, perhaps, succeeded in making himself "the person of the week," eclipsing the person in military uniform who frequently appears on the television screen.

Speaking to the journalists, General Nikolayev explained the reasons for the interest of the higher leadership authorities of the country in the problems of a radical restructuring of the border guard system and the elaboration of a common state border policy. According to his words, and this point of view was also shared by the

members of the SB [Security Council], the state border, including questions of state integrity, sovereignty, and security of the country under conditions that are new for Russia, assumes a decisive significance, such that both an increase in the reliability of guarding borders on the principle of reasonable sufficiency and the perfection of the structure of the FBS and the border troops remain significant in like manner, as does an integrated system of coordination of the activity of the staff of the commander in chief of the FBS with the ministries and departments in resolving the tasks of the defense of Russia's national interests on the border and the continental shelf, in economic zones, in international communications channels and border crossing points, and on borders of joint interests with CIS states.

The formation of independent states in the space of the former USSR, noted the commander in chief, resulted in changes not only in the status, transit, and the state-legal securing of the borders of Russia, but also on questions first and foremost of the integrity of the system of security and its infrastructure. Finally, the condition and position of the border troops have changed sharply. Andrey Nikolayev said that the difficult and explosive situation in some sectors is not conducive to security: There are also potentially possible territorial problems with states of the near and far abroad, an escalation of armed conflicts—and the danger of the emergence of new conflicts—the activation of the intelligence activities of the special services of some contiguous states (moreover, the Security Council members have directed their attention to the obviously pursued orientation of Russia's individual neighbors in the creation of regional military-political structures that are capable of both armed provocation and the geopolitical isolation of Russia), the increase in the scale of the misappropriation of the national wealth of Russia, the rise in the activity of international criminal groups that are shipping strategic raw materials, precious stones, and antiques across the border. Together with these cases, the border troops are the first to take on the full force of the growing migration stream across the border, especially in those areas where, as a result of the formation of independent states, a complete or partial breakdown has occurred in contacts between families, relatives, and peoples. The border troops also have occasion to encounter attempts by foreign citizens to take over Russian territory on the periphery of Russian lands and the transport of ecologically and epidemiologically dangerous cargo.

The importance of the tasks set for the Federal Border Service by the president and the Security Council of the

country germinated questions of financial and material-technical support of the border troops, whose leadership is seeking resources for the normal functioning of the border security system. (For information: Not one Russian FBS post, be it the Pamir or Franz Josef Land, experienced delays in the payment of monetary maintenance.) A rational revision of the country's combat equipment and armaments, communications systems, food, and other material resources that are on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense, could be provided painlessly; and, as it seems to the members of the Security Council, it could provide the border troops of Russia in a timely way with aviation and armored equipment, buildings, and structures being released by the armies.

President Yeltsin is paying particular attention to guaranteeing the personal security of the border troops, for which the close coordination of the departments of foreign intelligence, the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service], and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and assistance to the FBS, are recommended

Nikolayev on New Concept of Border Protection Service

*LD0608143794 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1227 GMT 6 Aug 94*

[Text] Russia's border service will gradually become a coordinating body for the numerous border protection ministries and departments, a structure that will incorporate border troops as an ingredient, the Federal Border Troops Supreme Commander Andrey Nikolayev declared.

Outlining the concept of a new border service at a conference of border troop commanders in Moscow Friday, the Federal Border Troops Supreme Commander Andrey Nikolayev explained that purely military border protection would be changed for a rational combination of military, political, and other means to safeguard Russia's frontiers.

He emphasized that such a doctrine pleased the President, government, and Duma of the Russian Federation.

In his words, the reform has been designed until 2000 and will be carried out in several stages, during the first of which, according to Nikolayev, the Border Troops are to become a much better force in terms of quality.

On CIS borders defence, he stressed: "We know where the interests of Russia lie, and we must safeguard not only Russia's economic and political interests but the interests of concrete ethnic Russians."

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Estonian Claims 'Absolutely Unrealistic'

MM2207112594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jul 94 First Edition p 6

[Interview with Vasily Svirin, head of the Russian delegation at talks with Estonia, by Boris Glebov; date, place not given: "On Both Sides of the Border. What Will the New Round of Russian-Estonian Talks Bring?"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] The latest round of Russian-Estonian talks is going on in Helsinki. This time the level of representation has been raised significantly. Apart from Special Envoy Vasily Svirin, who is head of the Russian delegation at the talks with Estonia, the Russian side is also being represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin, while Estonia, correspondingly, is represented by Vice Chancellor Raul Malk.

The proposal to conduct the latest round of talks on "neutral" territory, in Helsinki, was made by the Estonian side. The subject of the talks is the draft agreements on the status of Russian military pensioners in Estonia and the removal from operation of the nuclear reactors at the Russian Naval Training Center in Paldiski.

On the eve of his departure for Helsinki, Special Envoy Vasily Svirin explained Russia's stance at the talks in an exclusive interview with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA:

[Glebov] Vasily Vasilyevich, in addition to the question of military pensioners, the problem of the border has unexpectedly arisen between Russia and Estonia. The Estonian side, citing the Tartu Treaty of 1920, is laying claim to part of Russian territory. Will this problem be discussed at the talks in Helsinki?

[Svirin] These problems will not be left outside the framework of the talks. On the contrary, the given questions are part of the negotiating process. Russia's stance on this problem was expounded clearly a long time ago both to the Estonian side and to the international community: The Russian-Estonian border is where the line passes today, that is, where it has been since the moment of the recognition of Estonia's independence by the Russian Federation in 1991.

There can be no other solution to the border question, since any other decision would entail a violation of the Helsinki agreements on border questions and the provisions of the UN Charter on the same problem.

Over a period of two years we have been patiently trying to persuade the Estonian side that we should start the demarcation of the border together. The question of the border is paradoxical: After all, it was not we but precisely the Estonian border guards and customs officials who first established themselves on the present border between our states in 1992. It was the Estonian side that first established its posts and checkpoints there.

Russian customs officials and border guards only established themselves on this border several months later. On 18 June 1994 President Yeltsin signed an Edict on the Demarcation of the Russian-Estonian Border, and a government decree was adopted on the same subject.

The demarcation of the border is being conducted in a most serious way, according to all the rules. Border posts and other necessary markings which clearly determine the line of the Russian-Estonian border are being set up.

[Glebov] How has the Estonian side reacted to Russia's actions in terms of the demarcation of the border?

[Svirin] Estonia's reaction has been strictly negative, and it has accused us of taking unilateral actions, although our actions were taken a lot later than the actions taken by the Estonian side, which has enshrined in its Constitution the border as it was established by the (Tartu) Peace Treaty of 1920.

As for the actual Russian-Estonian Peace Treaty of 1920, that treaty stopped being valid in 1940, at the moment Estonia when joined the USSR.

I would like to stress that henceforth the Russian side is by no means refusing to discuss problems of the border between our countries. On the contrary, right at the very beginning of the negotiating process we proposed three draft agreements to the Estonian side. The first is "On the Border"; the second—"On the Demarcation of the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf"; and the last—"On Border Procedures."

The first draft agreement determines the specific line of the border (according to the Russian draft), and this is the actual current line of the Russian-Estonian border. But the Estonian side is refusing to discuss the first draft agreement, insisting on the border line as it was in the 1920 Peace Treaty.

In this connection Estonia is refusing to discuss the other two agreements, and meanwhile the question of the demarcation of the economic zone and the continental shelf in the Baltic is connected with the line of the land border. The starting point of the maritime border is the final point of the land border, that is, the mouth of the Narva river.

Today we have agreed practically all questions concerning Baltic waters with the Estonian side, and it only remains to "tie" the maritime border to the starting point of the land border.

[Glebov] Can Estonia lay claim to the Russian part of the Baltic shelf?

[Svirin] You can lay claim to whatever you like, but there is no legal basis behind these claims. The claims being made by the Estonian side are absolutely unrealistic, because Estonia also signed the Helsinki act, proclaiming inviolable all the borders which were established in Europe after 1945.

Second, these claims on our territory being made by Estonia are in direct contravention of the Russian-Estonian interstate treaty dated 12 January 1991, which was ratified both by Estonia and by Russia. This treaty clearly states that the sides respect each other's territorial integrity.

[Glebov] Finally, as I understand it, Russia is respecting Estonia's territorial integrity, while Estonia is not respecting Russia's? But, despite the optimistic hopes of an imminent improvement in Russian-Estonian relations, the Russian border is continuing to be reinforced?

[Svirin] Of course; there is no other way! We need a proper border, otherwise we will be doomed to a repetition of the tragic events of 31 March of this year, when several border guards died on the Pskov section of the Russian-Estonian border.

Because the border had not been marked, it is still not known exactly who crossed the border, where the violators hid, and, most important, on whose territory, Russia's or Estonia's, this tragedy occurred. This must not happen again.

Estonia Gets Its Own Way in Agreements

MM2707160994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jul 94 p 3

[Report by Leonid Levitskiy of IZVESTIYA: "Estonia Got Everything It Wanted, Prime Minister Mart Laar States, Moscow Believes It Managed To Get Its Own Way"]

[Text] Tallinn—The surprise meeting between the Russian and Estonian presidents, which Lennart Meri was officially invited to just a matter of hours before his departure, is the subject of animated discussion in the republic. Before the meeting and even during the talks Tallinn tirelessly emphasized that President Lennart Meri has no constitutional powers to sign interstate treaties or agreements. There were forecasts asserting that it was purely a working meeting that would result in a communiqué or joint statement of intent.

The start of the talks matched the predictions—it was tense and uncertain. Then came the sudden unexpected breakthrough and the signing of two agreements—on the withdrawal of all Russian troops by 31 August and on social guarantees for military pensioners. At his press conference in Moscow Lennart Meri made a high assessment of these documents: We have achieved our objective. The initial reaction in Estonia to the information reports was more restrained: The troop withdrawal is wonderful, but we will have to see about the guarantees for former servicemen.

Those were more or less the terms in which Prime Minister Mart Laar couched his statement on republic radio. But soon after in the television studio he appeared more than satisfied. Citing documents already received from Moscow and analyzed, the head of government

totally agreed with his president: The Estonians have gotten everything they wanted.

In Mart Laar's opinion, the agreement on military pensioners fully accords with Estonian legislation. Each veteran and member of a veteran's family will personally apply for an Estonian residence permit.

The agreement on military pensioners was the key to success at the talks, Mart Laar said. I am satisfied with this agreement. In my assessment, it is in line with Estonian legislation. It stresses that only some of the Russian military pensioners living in Estonia will receive a residence permit for the country. In some respects the agreement as concluded is actually tougher than the version the Estonian delegation took to Moscow. To be honest, we had no hopes that this agreement would be signed. The point of the agreement stating that Estonia can refuse a residence permit to pensioners who threaten its security is tougher than we could have hoped. We believe that all military pensioners threaten Estonia's security. The prime minister noted that Estonia may show humanity toward certain military pensioners in view of their services and age and give them a residence permit. Under the agreement signed in Moscow the majority of military pensioners and retirees will not get an Estonian residence permit. The treaty Russia concluded with Latvia and that with Estonia simply cannot be compared. The Estonian-Russian agreement gives us far greater scope to decide who should receive a residence permit and who should not.

The prime minister also specified: The agreement will first undergo expert legal assessment, after which it will be discussed by the Riigikogu deputies. Without their approval the document has no real force. Parliament is in recess until the end of August. Admittedly, it is said that the deputies will be assembled for an extraordinary session 15-18 August. It has to be borne in mind that the election campaign for the parliamentary elections (scheduled for March next year) has already begun.

Their attitude toward Russia and Russians still remains the main trump card of the national radicals, and "liberals" are effectively doomed to failure. So the presidents' agreement on social guarantees for pensioners will be discussed through the prism of the parliamentary elections. But the deadline for the withdrawal of the Russian troops is strict—31 August. The Union of Veterans Organizations received the initial news with disappointment. In their view, Boris Yeltsin signed the precise option for deciding pensioners' fate that Estonia had been insisting on for six months—dealing individually with each veteran and retiree. And the decision-making mechanism automatically cuts out a considerable proportion of veterans and members of their families.

Russians in Tallinn remember how the treaty on interstate relations between Russia and Estonia was signed during the night of 12 January 1991. At that time

Russian diplomats, who in those days had little experience, rejoiced that now every Russian living in Estonia could freely obtain Estonian citizenship. It later transpired that almost everyone did indeed have the right to request citizenship. But the prescribed naturalization procedure was such that only one or two people out of 10 could get through it. So there are still almost 0.5 million "aliens" and people without a homeland in Estonia.

Now, as then, experts in Moscow seem to be satisfied—the question of social protection for military pensioners has been solved. While the Estonian leaders add: Within the limits of state legislation. But even before the Moscow meeting nobody was advocating its violation. So what then was the point of all the recent menacing Russian demarches—the halting of troop trains?

UKRAINE

Decree on Land Occupied by Military Units

94UM05284 Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Aug 94 p 1

[Crimean Supreme Council Decree: "Land Occupied by Military Units and Institutions and the Procedure for Payment for Its Use"]

[Text] The Supreme Council of Crimea decrees:

1. That the information of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Military Matters, Security, and Protection of the Rights of Servicemen "Land Occupied by Military Units and Institutions and the Procedure for Payment for Its Use" be taken under advisement.
2. That the Government of Crimea:
 - 2.1. Prior to 15 September 1994 inventory the land occupied by military units on the territory of the Republic of Crimea.
 - 2.2. Prior to 1 September 1994 submit proposals to the Supreme Council of Crimea on termination of the right to use the plots of land that are not being used and that are being used for purposes other than intended for their transfer to the land reserves of the local councils.
 - 2.3. Prior to 1 September 1994 to harmonize with the governments of Ukraine and Russia a procedure for payment for land occupied by military units and institutions.
3. That prior to 1 January 1995 the local councils redraft the instruments allocating land to military units and institutions located on the territory of the Republic of Crimea.

[Signed] S. Tsekov, chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea
City of Simferopol, 20 July 1994
No. 103-1.

Decree on Military Subunit Legislation

94UM0528B Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Aug 94 p 1

[Crimean Supreme Council Decree: "Preparation of Bills on the Status of Military Subunits Stationed on the Territory of the Republic of Crimea and the Procedure for Their Use of the Land, Air Space, Bodies of Water, Mineral Resources, and Other Natural Resources and Infrastructure"]

[Text] The Supreme Council of Crimea decrees:

That prior to 1 November 1994 the standing commissions of the Supreme Council of Crimea for military matters, security, and protection of the rights of servicemen, economic and budgetary and financial policy, and the environment and the rational use of natural resources and land issues and the Government of Crimea shall prepare bills on the status of military subunits stationed on the territory of the Republic of Crimea and the procedure for their use of the land, air space, bodies of water, mineral resources, other natural resources, and infrastructure.

[Signed] S. Tsekov, chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea
City of Simferopol, 20 July 1994
No. 102-1

Mukhin on Prospects for Defense Industry

WS0108133094 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI
in Russian 26 Jul 94 p 3

[Interview with Volodymyr Mukhin, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission for Issues of Defense and National Security, by Sergey Rakhmanin; place and date not given: "Parliament Presidium Member Volodymyr Mukhin: 'We Will Try To Sell Any Weapon Produced in Ukraine'"—first two paragraphs are KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI introduction; questions published in boldface]

[Text] Since 31 May 1994, Volodymyr Mukhin has been the chairman of the Permanent Parliamentary Commission for Issues of Defense and National Security. He was born in 1949 in the city of Stary Krym. He is Russian, married with two sons. He is a member of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, doctor of physical-mathematical sciences, graduate of the Kharkov State University. He was working on theoretical research of plasma physics. In 1983, he joined the CPSU. Between 1971 and 1994, he worked at the Kharkov Physical-Technical Institute. In 1990, he became secretary of the Kharkov Physical-Technical Institute Communist Party Committee. His last post was that of department chief. He is a Ukrainian people's deputy in the 370th Kiyevskiy constituency. Volodymyr Mukhin's deputy powers were questioned by the Ukrainian Supreme Council Temporary Credentials Commission due to exceeding the elections deadline. On 12 May, the parliament confirmed the future commission chairman's powers.

The Commission for Issues of Defense and National Security is one of the most important deputy bodies. Kharkov resident Volodymyr Mukhin, who chairs this commission, is a new man in politics. We believe that it will be interesting for KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI readers to become familiar with the main "defense" specialist in parliament.

[Rakhmanin] Volodymyr Vasylovych, not long ago, the Ukrainian Supreme Council surprisingly put on its agenda the issue of suspending the transfer of nuclear weapons from the territory of our state, and later, also surprisingly, the parliament withdrew it. How would you comment on that situation?

[Mukhin] The issue did not appear suddenly. The Tripartite Declaration [on nuclear disarmament] placed concrete responsibilities on Ukraine, as well as on Russia and the United States. We have been fulfilling everything ever since. Our partners, however, have proven unscrupulous. For instance, the Americans promised us \$700 million, moreover, half of this sum should have been spent directly on works concerning the transfer of nuclear warheads. Instead of that, we have so far received only \$60 million. With such resources, we are not able to complete all of the work scheduled in the 43d Army, and our national budget will not endure such expenditures. Thus, the indignation of deputies was fully justified. The issue of removing nuclear warheads was temporarily taken off the agenda—it must be thoroughly examined. In the near future, three commissions—ours, the one for foreign affairs, and the one for issues of nuclear policy and nuclear safety—will hold hearings of specialists and leaders responsible for the fulfillment of conditions stemming from the Tripartite Declaration.

[Rakhmanin] How realistic are the prospects for sales of Ukrainian weapons?

[Mukhin] There are around 2,000 enterprises in the Ukrainian defense industry. It is impossible to support this sector without possibilities to enter markets. We are already actively working in this direction. As everybody knows, the sale of weapons, combat equipment, and military technology is one of the most profitable businesses. In the United States, for example, every dollar invested in military production returns between 20 and 30 dollars in profit. The last time I was convinced that it is necessary to exhort the issue of developing a mechanism for establishing a market for Ukrainian weapons was during my visit to the United States, where I had an opportunity to meet with representatives of approximately 50 of the largest U.S. defense firms.

We have left many arms markets, and even though it is difficult to return to them, we will do that; we will begin to offer our products (of course, within the limits of defined quotas), and will try to ensure that these are the best products in the world. Our country already has a competitive product—a tank produced by the Kharkov Malyshev plant (the last modification of the T-80 tank—S.R.), which has no match in the world. We will try to sell

any weapon produced in Ukraine, and not only weapons, but also spare parts and technology. Alas, I cannot speak of our potential markets—it is quite natural that this is a secret.

[Rakhmanin] How will we be able to recapture our place in such a profitable business, especially given the tough competition?

[Mukhin] This is not an immediate issue. In physics, there is a method of consecutive approximations. In the first place, Ukraine should form a closed production cycle, and later it should seriously work on the quality of its products (I repeat—they must be the best in the world), and display Ukrainian prototypes at special exhibitions. This problem is quite broad and complex—trade regulations in Ukraine and a majority of countries do not conform to each other, because every state protects its market.

[Rakhmanin] How much time is needed to organize a closed production cycle, for example, at enterprises producing tanks?

[Mukhin] We lack only two large components. We have already studied this issue—Ukraine can easily cope with this issue in a year or a year and a half. Unfortunately, due to understandable reasons, I cannot provide you details concerning the entire complexity of issues and reliable mechanisms for resolving them.

[Rakhmanin] Do you expect that the new president will help in this regard?

[Mukhin] I count on fruitful and close cooperation with Leonid Kuchma. First of all, he is familiar with the problems of the defense industry. Second, Leonid Danylovych was planning to work in our commission if he had lost the presidential elections. Moreover, he is a wise man, and understands that the defense industry is a powerful system, which will yield colossal profits if it is not placed in an idiotic situation. One of the first issues I will have to discuss with our state leader is a concept of Ukrainian national security.

[Rakhmanin] According to this concept, will the Ukrainian Armed Forces be significantly reduced?

[Mukhin] The Army currently numbers 500,000 people, and it is planned that its numerical force will eventually fall to approximately 350,000. In this regard, there is a problem of jobs for officers who are subject to reductions. According to the current plan, officers released from duties in the Armed Forces can obtain legal education and continue their service in the Army structures, the Interior Ministry, or customs houses.

[Rakhmanin] What kind of difficulties have you encountered during your brief work in the new post?

[Mukhin] The Commission for Issues of Defense and National Security is not only one of the most complex, but also one of the largest commissions. Currently, this permanent parliamentary body employs 26 people, and

in the near future it will be decided whether an additional seven deputies, who have expressed their desire to work in the commission, will join us. The deputy corps, as everybody knows, is a quite varied picture. Our commission is not an exception. Unfortunately, legislators often act in accordance with their narrow political interests, which have nothing in common with the development of the defense industry. Currently, the main goal of the commission is to work out a common strategy for primary issues, so that discrepancies of our views do not affect the all-state cause. Without it, the main problems, particularly those concerning financing the Army and the Security Service [SBU], will not be resolved. As far as I am concerned, I am trying to unite our deputy body, and practically all of my colleagues have admitted that I have been successful.

Stepan Khmara [chairman of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party], whose principal position I have always respected, is very useful in the commission. I have also been working in harmony with Yaroslav Ilyasevych, a member of the Ukrainian National Assembly- Ukrainian National Self Defense. After all, he represents a paramilitary organization, which understands, for example, problems of the defense industry. It is easy to work with him, because he stands for preserving the Army, and so do I. The unanimous voting for the SBU chief was the best proof that my work had not been in vain.

I also consider the results of the recent visit to the United States by a parliamentary delegation, which I led, as a serious success. We managed to ensure that Ukraine will participate in meetings between Russian and U.S. legislators. A tripartite conference, with the participation of representatives of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, the Russian State Duma, and the U.S. Congress, will be held in Kiev, perhaps in October. Defense issues will be priority at the conference, and additionally, parliamentarians from the three countries will discuss economic and international issues. Many U.S. congressmen have expressed their desire to visit the Ukrainian capital. The results of our visit are also very important in a political sense, and while reporting on the results of the visit to [Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman] Oleksandr Moroz, I emphasized this. By the way, our trip to America did not cost our budget a single kopek—all expenses were paid by the U.S. side. Unfortunately, we do not have the same funds as the U.S. Congress to develop interparliamentary relations.

Lopata: Coalition Fleet in Black Sea Possible

MK2707124294 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Jul 94 p 3

[Interview with Anatoliy Lopata, chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, by Nikolay Plotnikov, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA military observer, under the "First-Hand" rubric: "Anatoliy Lopata: 'Cutting Ties at Once Would Be Absurd, and Simply Impossible.' The Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff Considers a Coalition Fleet on the Black Sea a Possibility"]

[Text] [Plotnikov] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, what is the current status of the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Lopata] As of today, they include four armed services—the Army, the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy. With over 526,000 men, this is Europe's second largest armed force after Russia. Presently, a concept for the organization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has been devised, on the basis of which appropriate development programs up to the year 2010 have been drawn up. They are currently being agreed upon at all levels. The implementation of these programs will make it possible to optimize the strength and composition of the Armed Forces, to give them a new, modern outlook, and also to raise the troops' combat readiness.

What Armed Forces do we envision? First of all, a trend is visible toward merging the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces into a single armed service under the name of Air Defense Troops. This will enable us to raise the effectiveness of command and control over personnel and weapons, and to considerably reduce the command structures. At a time when the state is in dire economic and financial straits, this will be of considerable importance.

The number of military districts has been cut. It is well known that earlier there were three military districts on Ukrainian territory. Now there are two: the Odessa District, which included personnel and weapons of the former Kiev Military District, and the Carpathian District. The 17th Air Force Army is being disbanded. The 8th separate Air Defense Army has been reorganized into three air defense districts. This is a fairly strong force. It should be said frankly that our Air Defense operates within a single radar space and in close contact with the Air Defense systems of our neighbors, Russia and Belarus. The Air Defense grouping at the southwestern sector in the Armed Forces of the former USSR was fairly formidable, and it will be fairly hard for Russia to restore its strength. Apparently, we have to look for mutually acceptable ways in this situation.

[Plotnikov] That is, you do not rule out the creation of a joint regional air defense system?

[Lopata] No, even at present we operate without cutting old ties. Russia, too, draws on the results of our work. Cutting ties at once would be absurd, and simply impossible.

The Ukrainian Navy is at the organizational stage. Its future depends on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. When drawing up a concept of the organization of our own Navy, we have been guided primarily by the existing agreements on the division of the Black Sea Fleet. But here there are lots of problems that have yet to be resolved.

The Ukrainian Army is in the process of organization. It is a formidable force. I think that all the problems our Army may encounter—organizational, personnel, and military-technical—are still ahead. All these have to be tackled. The latest meeting of the CIS Council of

Defense Ministers was devoted precisely to searching for solutions to these problems.

[Plotnikov] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, that was the first time that you attended a meeting of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers. Are you satisfied with its results?

[Lopata] Without doubt. I am satisfied with the approaches to many problems. Particularly those concerning military-technical cooperation. I was also pleased by the desire of the defense ministers and the chiefs of the general staffs to find a solution to the problem.

[Plotnikov] And is the collective security system about which so much was said at the meeting worth creating?

[Lopata] It would be wrong to reject a collective security system. It has existed always. Evidently, it is essential that all Commonwealth states should consider it, taking into account their national interests and regional requirements. As for Ukraine, according to the legislation enacted by our state, it does not belong to any blocs, to say nothing of military ones. In this particular case, I do not have the powers to argue for Ukraine's joining one alliance or another overnight. This is regulated by appropriate legislation. But presently we clearly see that the need for coordination precisely in security matters, for mutual assistance in solving a number of military-technical problems, is evident. Without this coordination we are simply growing weaker. Not only Ukraine, but also Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and virtually all the states of the Commonwealth sense that.

[Plotnikov] What settlement of the Black Sea Fleet's fate do you envision?

[Lopata] The problem of the Black Sea Fleet is one of the most painful elements of the internal political situation in our state, particularly in Crimea. This is also a problem in our relations with Russia. There are lots of matters that have yet to be solved. I think that tomorrow, if not today, we will have to sit down at the negotiating table to assess the situation in Crimea and to search for mutually acceptable solutions. For instance, I personally do not rule out the existence of a coalition fleet. There are such fleets in the world. Why is it that we cannot solve the Black Sea Fleet problem by clearly defining Ukraine's share and Russia's share, but also by undertaking to fulfill for some time to come a single mission of protecting the sea borders of our states under a single command? With a normal political approach to this problem, it will not take much effort to cope with the technical details. Most important, we need to understand each other, to respect each other, and to show readiness to realize the other side's problems.

Ukrainian Border Troops Introduce Paid Pilot Services

944F1111A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 Jul 94 p 5

[Article by Viktor Yadukha: "Conflict: Importunate Service: Ukrainian Border Troops Charge Fee for Passage Through Kerch Strait"]

[Text] Recently the captain of the Russian ship Volgo-Balt 247, as he was guiding his ship through the Kerch Strait, unexpectedly had to use pilot services that were imposed on him and for which he had to pay. It takes only hour to get from the beginning of the strait to the end, and the route is well known to all the region's ship navigators. However, armed Ukrainian naval border troops forced the captain to sign a piloting contract and to confirm payment by radiogram in the amount of \$2,200. Judging from the remarks of the captain of the Kerch port, the incident was not an isolated one and naval units of the Ukrainian border troops intend to continue to act in this manner.

Official Kiev remains silent, and the Black Sea Fleet, as a SEGODNYA correspondent was able to learn, intends to take Russian navigation in the Kerch Strait under its protection. Another conflict is brewing.

Some background: The Kerch-Yenikalskiy channel was ceded by Turkey to Russia along with the Kuban, Kerch, Azov, etc., exactly 220 years ago, in July 1774, in the signing of the Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiyskiy Peace Treaty. Having gained possession of both banks of the strait, Russia won the right to fully regulate navigation in the region, a right that was inherited by the USSR. The right of Ukraine, which had been a part of a united country throughout this time, was never codified separately.

So far there exist only general "binding edicts on the Kerch commercial seaport" that exempt captains of transiting ships whose shipping lines have given them permission to navigate through the Kerch-Yenikalskiy channel from the requirement to use the services of a pilot. But the 1982 UN convention on maritime law says that in view of the geographic location of the Kerch Strait and the status of the waters that form it, the best option for ships transiting through it would be the generally recognized regime of the straits of Gibraltar, Malacca, Singapore, Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and others. The convention gives foreign vessels (including foreign warships) the right to unimpeded passage through such straits. A warship that encounters a foreign ship is not allowed to search it unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is engaging in the slave trade or unauthorized broadcasting, does not have national markings, or is engaging in piracy (article 110 of the document). Meanwhile, the convention defines piracy as "any unlawful act of violence...aimed against any ship...at a location outside the jurisdiction of any state" (articles 101 and 102).

The actions of the Ukrainian border troops with respect to the Volgo-Balt 247 fall completely under these articles, especially as point three of article 27 of the convention demands that authorities, before taking any measures, provide notification of any planned intervention to a diplomatic agent or consular official of the state under whose flag the ship is sailing.

In the view of Captain 1st Rank Samokhvalov, a Black Sea Fleet expert, the fact that one side of the navigable part of the Kerch-Yenikalskiy channel is adjacent to the

shores of the Crimea makes Ukraine want to gain some benefit and unilaterally grant itself the right to regulate navigation in the strait. Meanwhile, the convention gives states adjacent to a strait the right to enact universally binding laws and regulations governing transit passage only in the event that such laws and regulations do not discriminate against foreign ships and only provided a bilateral agreement has been concluded with the state adjacent to the strait on the other side. There is no such agreement as yet between Russia and Ukraine, although one is clearly needed. Black Sea Fleet officers think the problem of the strait must be solved in the near future. "The Black Sea Fleet, as a fleet of the Russian Federation

and Ukraine, acting as an intermediary, is entitled to take Russian ships in the Kerch Strait under its protection by setting up a patrol service," said Captain 1st Rank Samokhvalov. "The Kerch international strait must be made subject to a regime that differs from the regime governing a territorial sea and that provides for unimpeded passage of ships, including warships."

In view of the military's customary command principle for releasing information, according to which an officer may speak on behalf of his department only with the permission of his superiors, it can be assumed that this is the position of the Black Sea Fleet command.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Potential for Defense Industry Cooperation With Europe

944F09841 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Jul 94 p 4

[Article by Sergey Paliy: "Russia Wants Common Military Production With Europe. The Domestic Market Cannot Recover Without a Breakthrough Onto the Foreign Market"]

[Text] Russia is lagging considerably behind even the East European states in the implementation of economic reforms. They are already beginning to scramble out of the crisis; we, on the other hand, are wallowing in it increasingly. The decline in production in the first quarter of 1994 constituted 25 percent as compared with the same period of last year, and productivity has in five months declined just about twofold.

Our stores, on the other hand, are piled high with imported commodities, inasmuch as it is unprofitable for entrepreneurs and businessmen to invest money in Russian enterprises.

Fortunately, our bankers have already begun to understand the seriousness of the current situation. The Association of Russian Banks, for example, is convinced that even foreign trade activity will soon be unable to match the advantages of cooperation with foreign firms. The aspiration of our bankers to cooperate with East Europe, where dozens of underloaded enterprises of the military-industrial complex are located, is understandable, of course. But they have lost sight of the fact that the markets left by Russian equipment manufacturers were immediately captured by Western corporations and firms of the military-industrial complex from that same East Europe. As a result, for them, increased production and reduced unemployment; for us, on the other hand, a decline in production and, at times, the complete stoppage of enterprises of the military-industrial complex, a colossal growth of hidden unemployment, and an increase in the social instability of society.

I would recall that Czechoslovakia, which proclaimed a policy of total conversion, has already turned back onto the beaten path of arms production and exports. A couple of years ago it supplied overseas several million dollars' worth of tanks manufactured under Soviet license. It is obvious that the equipment that it sold was needed by someone or other, for the market abhors a vacuum. Consequently, had Czechoslovakia not sold these tanks, such military equipment would have been sold by Germany, France, Britain, or the United States. In figures the situation appears as follows: in 1992 the United States exported 1,241 tanks; Russia, just seven tanks. And it is very, very difficult to make up for what has been lost.

So it was that we approached the first principle of arms production. The output of mechanical engineering plants

is a source of currency for any state. Weapons have at all times been made not only for the sake of war but also for the sake of obtaining profits. The reduction in arms exports has had for us, therefore, severe consequences.

Having "frozen" the activity of the defense enterprises, the Government of Russia was deprived of the most stable and abundant source of currency. Why not say precisely: This year enterprises of the military-industrial complex should sell so many tanks, guns, shells, and missiles, next year, this many. This would help us embark calmly on conversion.

Conversion in Russia should have been started, most likely, not with the termination of arms production in general, but with a numerical reduction in the Army and the formation of a potent rapid-deployment force. And the manufacture of military equipment needs to be upgraded. The fact that Arab countries preferred to purchase the American M1-A2 Abrams tanks and the French Leclerc tanks, not Russian tanks, testifies to the underdevelopment of our materiel resources.

It is no secret that machine tools and equipment that are 40-60 years old are employed at many Russian plants. At the same time, on the other hand, the leading European countries are putting the emphasis on high-technology production. In a couple of years a whole number of foundries will have been closed down there. But Europe's powerful metal-working industry, which includes hundreds of plants of the military-industrial complex, cannot be left without source material. For this reason Western firms are purchasing from us energy- and materials-consuming ferrous and nonferrous metal blanks. At home they are cut up in parts and sent to converters and electric arc and electron beam furnaces. As a result we have inherited the environmentally dirty production of cheap steel, others, its environmentally clean remelting and the manufacture of costly special steels and their products.

From time to time a Western firm will offer to supply us with modern equipment and know-how in exchange for supplies of finished products. But why not develop such cooperation on a broader basis? No one is calling, of course, for the production at Urals plants of German Leopard tanks, although their assembly is being swiftly established in Sweden.

Those same tanks, all-terrain vehicles, and engineering machinery require spares, components, and units, incidentally. We could, for example, build the transmission; this is not at all the same thing as manufacturing the whole tank. So much combat and other equipment is being manufactured in the West that the need for our steel and nonferrous metals is permanently high there. So why should we not manufacture the finished products that they need.

However paradoxical, the preservation of the production of military equipment in Russia could contribute to

peace on earth. First, the manufacture of military hardware for our Army would decline. Second, thanks to our production of individual arms systems and components for Western countries such production with them would automatically decline. Third, the production of military equipment would be internationalized, that is, it would be Russian, as it were. I shall explain: We could supply some spares to Germany and France, some components to Italy and Britain, and some units to Turkey, Spain, or any other country. In addition, stable exports of spares for military equipment of foreign and domestic manufacture could prove far more beneficial than exports of the equipment itself. The main thing is that this would be the start of Russia's integration in the system of world economic relations, where everyone produces what happens to be better and cheaper for him than for others.

The defense initiatives of the NATO members and Russia could be coordinated thanks to economic integration, incidentally. Having "common" military production with Russia, the European states could economize appreciably on military spending and wind down in planned fashion the production of types of arms that are inefficient compared with other countries, purchasing more modern equipment from their partners.

It is very important that the European states recognize that it is far more advantageous to have Russia as an economic partner, not a political adversary.

Russia has immense military-industrial complex capacity. But its export possibilities are being used to the extent of only 10 percent. Russian MiG and SU-class aircraft with electronic systems of European manufacture could, notably, constitute real competition for American products. And the Ka-50 and Black Hawk helicopters, Tu-80U and T-90 tanks, the Piranha, Triton, and Amur submarines, and the S-300, TOR-M1, and Tunguska SAM batteries would be a subject of envy for other countries.

It is exceptionally important that Russia could supply the entire spectrum of modern arms to pay off its international credit. Turkey has already availed itself of this situation. It was the first NATO country to purchase combat equipment in Russia: helicopters, armored transport vehicles, and small arms.

Not only military equipment, but also technical services in a "package" could be supplied. Point of information: Military services alone could produce one-fourth of the earnings from arms exports.

Russian aircraft and helicopters are in the arsenals of many countries, incidentally. The production of some, such as the MiG-21, has been terminated here. But spares for them are still in demand. And it is time to supply new electronic systems. And this means new orders and an influx of currency into our budget.

Lest overseas orders for the modernization of our equipment be intercepted by firms of third countries, it is

essential to coordinate the activity of the enterprises of Russia's military-industrial complex. It is contemplated amalgamating eight branch commercial banks and creating a military-industrial export-import bank.

Of course, Russia has now been weakened, and it will not become a world leader any time soon. But it is essential that we pull ourselves out of the economic crisis as quickly as possible. It is time we understood that we will not recover on the domestic market without breakthroughs onto the foreign market.

Reporter Infiltrates Nuclear Black Market

AT3107155394 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
29 Jul 94 p 10

[Report by Kyrill Belyaninov: "Moscow Reporter Who Posed as a Buyer on the Nuclear Black Market": "Plutonium, Stacked High"]

[Text] He has something that nobody wants to buy, Nikolay says, opening wide the rusty door of the old garage. "Something too hot, too uncomfortably hot. We have been sitting on it for six months." In a corner, behind some trash and empty gas cans, there is a white cone. "A nuclear warhead," Nikolay says. "SS-20, state of the art." He caresses the military markings almost lovingly. "\$70,000 and you can have it picked it up immediately."

We take a few Polaroid photos of Nikolay's warhead and tell him that, of course, our "people in Moscow" first have to be certain. Nikolay nods. However, he needs a definite decision within three days.

The SS-20 warhead certainly has a real casing. But its contents could long ago have been taken out for servicing and replaced with technical scrap. "If you take this one," Nikolay says, slightly kicking the cone with his foot. "we are going to bring a new one. At the moment, it is still in Ukraine."

Nikolay was one of many nuclear brokers whom we had found under utmost security measures. By then I had investigated the black market for nuclear material for six months with my two colleagues, journalists Vladimir and Dmitriy. We pretended to be brokers, naturally using false names. After a certain starting period, when we already thought that everything had been in vain, we held telephone conversations with dealers almost every day, listened to promises, waited, received samples, went to laboratories, gave them samples, waited, picked up samples, and had to invent ever new, credible lies for the dubious go-betweens. We were always aware of what would have happened to us if one of them had discovered our true identity.

One year ago we had an appointment in an apartment house in Moscow's city center. We met our agent on the first floor. In the apartment we saw several desks and an old fax. The agent sighed, nervously scratched the back of his head, and asked: "You know the conditions, don't

you?" From a modest iron cabinet he took one of those cardboard cartons that are used to sell cakes in Russia. The box contained a lead tube with a small hole in its cover. When he took the tube out of the box, small, dirty-white flakes fell to the table. The two bodyguards of the "broker" jumped back in fright. "Don't worry," the boss said. "We put in some detergent so that the sample cannot roll out of the container immediately."

The radiation measuring instrument shrieked. "Plutonium-239, precisely what you ordered," the agent nodded. "Conditions are as usual: You can take the sample along for exactly 24 hours. Tomorrow you must tell us whether you want the entire shipment. Then we can discuss the mode of delivery." With these words he pressed the cake box into my hands.

The next day we took the carton with the lead tube to Sergey Belopukhov, the director of the Moscow Supervisory Center for Radiation Analyses. "There is no doubt that this is plutonium," Belopukhov said. "But the sample also contains caesium, americium, thorium, and some other fission products. The typical waste products of a reactor. Terrorists can only dream of such material. But one cannot build a real nuclear bomb with it."

Our first steps in February 1993 had not yielded any results. We posed as young businessmen and met with dozens of brokers at the Moscow raw material exchange. We talked to anyone who traded in rare metals. We studied applications for export licenses in the Foreign Trade Ministry. All we learned was: Everyone had already heard of the nuclear market, but no one had so far seen a live plutonium merchant.

No wonder that we had bad luck for such a long time. Only later did we get to know the iron rule: In order to get into the nuclear business, one must be recommended to a broker by two of his colleagues.

After two months we achieved the first success, when the brokers at the stock exchange began to consider us as insiders of the "scene." We received one of the first offers from a man at the Moscow raw material stock exchange: five kg of uranium-235, 80 percent enriched. For the handing over of the "sample" we met him in a crowded Moscow street at rush hour. He pulled a laboratory container and an official certificate of quality from the laboratory of the State Institute for Rare Metals (Giremet) out of his briefcase.

We had this sample, too, tested at the Moscow Supervisory Center for Radiation Analyses. The certificate was correct. However, since we were not able to buy the enriched uranium, we pretended that we would pay for the 2.5-gram sample only when we had seen all the goods. When our go-between heard that, he seemed to lose interest and disappeared.

But now things really got started. After a few days his colleagues virtually swamped us with the most varied offers of "samples" and Giremet certificates. There were

offers to deliver uranium and plutonium directly abroad. We took everything to the Center for Radiation Analyses. Only one container contained uranium, and that was only 2 to 3 percent enriched. The other samples contained metal dust, icing sugar, and a few grams of caesium. One container was completely empty.

In the new Russian lingo the swindlers are called "ventilators" because they are selling nothing but air. Trading in air has always been part of entrepreneurial activities in Russia, but it has never been more attractive than now. The structure of these deals is quite simple: A broker finds a customer who wants to buy a few kilos of nuclear material, for instance. He gives him a sample for analysis and gets a certain sum as a down payment. Practically anything can be used as a "sample"—beginning with a few grams of real material (which can easily be gotten from the innumerable laboratories of institutes) to an empty lead container. The latter is irradiated for several hours and thus deceives simple measuring instruments.

All agreements in this business are concluded on the basis of the dollar. After the broker has received the down payment, he disappears for about a week. While the cheated buyer is looking for his broker everywhere and shows the (in this case) forged certificate and the empty container to all "experts," his money is producing new money. It is used as capital for quick loans or for speculations with the exchange rate of dollar and ruble. If the broker has received a down payment of \$2,000 to \$3,000, he makes a profit of \$200 to \$300. In the end, he meets his customer again, apologizes exhaustively because of the inadvertently insufficient sample, and returns the original sum to the customer.

More "serious" brokers and buyers usually consult an independent person when they exchange the samples, to exclude "ventilators." In these cases both partners hand several thousand dollars to a third person. If someone does not stick to the conditions of the contract—quality of the goods and the agreed price—he loses his down payment.

Once we were called by an important contact, who told us that a "broker" was inviting us to an appointment in his office. The sample, which we received at the first meeting, was a forgery—just commercial uranium and tiny traces of plutonium-240 in the container. We returned to demand a better sample. "Well, I do not know what I should do," the deputy director of the nameless company said. Aleksey—his name or his cover name—claimed that he worked in the secret nuclear factory Slatoust 36 for 15 years. He held a bent lead mould in his hand. "This plate weighs about 30 grams, and whatever is beneath it costs a lot of money."

Finally, Aleksey came to a decision. He sent his employees out of the office. Then he broke the lead mould apart with hammer and chisel and took out a metal plate; it took him 10 minutes to break off a small bit. "Look," he said with triumph and held a radiation

measuring instrument close. The counter immediately jumped to the edge of the scale.

We discussed the price: \$1,500 per kilo. Then Aleksey explained to us for half an hour how the goods could be taken across the border. He promised to transport 20-kg plates, covered with plutonium, to the port of Klaipeda (Memel) in Lithuania. He could also deliver the goods directly to Germany, but that would, of course, cost considerably more.

Aleksey wrapped the small fragment in plastic foil, which he surrounded with lead. This sample, too, we showed to Sergey Belopukhov. "This is plutonium," he assured us after his tests. Belopukhov registered small amounts of plutonium-239, -240, and -242. The fragment was covered with a layer of these elements—a few microns thick. Only a complicated chemical process would be able to separate the plutonium from the metal.

We canceled our deal with Aleksey. He was willing to reduce the price to one-fifth and to pay the costs of transportation. But we pretended to be tough dealers: nuclear power as a mixture, no thank you.

In total, we were involved with 28 dealers. They mainly traded in metals, that is, on a real and stable market. They sold nuclear material only if this promised high profits. Only two merchants managed to conclude deals. In December 1992 a German bought 10 kg of caesium-137. In March 1993 an Arab purchased half a kilo of uranium-238. Of course, we could not believe every word we were told. However, through our contacts with the respective competitors we had at least a relatively useful network for checking information.

Our research convinced us of two things. First: The stories about the permanent stream of nuclear material which is crossing the borders of the former Soviet Union, are myths. Second: In individual cases and with the participation of state structures everything is possible.

To conclude our research, we asked a high-ranking official in the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy for his comment. He answered all our questions briefly and dryly: "We do not have such information."

Somehow, we felt uncomfortable.

Defense Electronics Plants To Produce Medical Instruments

94UM0524B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Vadim Khusainov under the rubric "Conversion: The 'Triton' Alternative"]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—An exhibition, Medical Radioelectronics, has been opened at the Yekaterinburg Radio Museum. It was arranged by a local association of medical technologies. Radioelectronics has long since

come to the aid of medicine. Popov, inventor of the radio, made the first X-ray unit in Russia for his wife, a doctor.

Unfortunately, radioelectronics was subsequently placed at the service of the military-industrial complex, which is far removed from the problems of medical workers. The purpose of the exhibition in Yekaterinburg is to unite the interests of doctors and instrument-makers.

Taking part in it are both former giants of the defense industry and companies representing both small- and mid-scale business. Specifically, the Ural Electrical Engineering Plant is exhibiting a system for reducing psychological stress, the Dipole audioelectronic system.

The Avtomatika association has developed a pulse-and-oxygen meter, an instrument which constantly monitors the pulse and the concentration of oxygen in the blood, which is essential for performing major operations and for the performance of resuscitation teams. The small Triton company is displaying its version, competing with the enormous plant. The Averon company's kilns for baking the porcelain for dentures are being purchased in Europe. The scientific medical center for preventive medicine for workers of industrial enterprises has brought an instrument by means of which oxygen can be produced in any hospital. Furthermore, the oxygen is many times purer than that delivered in bottles.

The exhibition will run through mid-August.

No Financing for Conversion of Electronic Instrument Plant

94UM0524A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Yanchenko: "In Idle: The Initiative of the Ryazan Instrument Builders Is Sinking Under an Avalanche of Paperwork"]

[Text] Ryazan—A truly unique situation: all the new products of an enormous enterprise fit inside an elegant, ordinary-looking little suitcase. Luminescent lights of various shapes and sizes shine in neat rows out of special recesses.

"With this little suitcase I have gone to all the levels of authority, right up to the very highest," said Yevgeniy Fomin, director of the Elektronnyye Pribory open-type, joint-stock company. "I was received by Shokhin, by Soskovets...."

Like all the giants of the former defense industry the Ryazan enterprise has found itself in a difficult situation under the conditions of conversion. The state order today is around three percent of the overall production volume, and, in order to survive and not lose highly skilled workers, it was necessary to make an intensive

search for new ideas. A course of respecializing production for new energy-conserving technologies was thus worked out.

It was proposed that the Ryazan instrument builders set up the production of modern, highly economical luminescent lamps, which, with identical lighting features, use one fifth the electric energy and last eight times as long as incandescent lights.

Document:

The Ministry of Finance of Russia (S.K. Dubin), the State Defense Industry Committee of Russia (V.K. Glukhikh), the Ministry of Heat and Energy (Yu.K. Shafranik) and the EES Rossii rayon production association (A.F. Dyakov):

should implement precisely such proposals on a priority basis. I ask them carefully to consider and to establish sources of financing and to adopt decisions providing financial support for this project.

O. Soskovets
5 February 1994

"Our joint-stock company (the former Ryazan Electronic Instrument Plant)," the director continued, "has a unique production base. We have our own glass- and metal-working and stamping operations, an electroplating shop, a casting facility, a tile-stamping shop, and so forth. We have our own specialized machine-building facility with design office and a developed instrument-making operation. The most important thing is the large group of highly skilled specialists."

Document:

from a letter to the Government of the Russian Federation of 5 April 1994:

A study of this proposal has shown that the availability at the plant of experienced personnel, equipment and the basic technologies, as well as idle areas from the conversion of production make it possible rapidly to set up regular production of the lights (lamps and switches).

Effectiveness of the proposal is assured by the fact:

—as much as 720,000 tons of standard fuel annually will result from the adoption of the new lamps, which increases Russia's export capabilities by 30 million dollars;

—the production of compact luminescent bulbs and lamps which use them will provide more than 300 billion rubles in net profit annually. The proposed project will pay for itself in no more than three years....

The document is signed by P. Mostov, deputy chairman of Russia's State Committee for Property, V. Glukhikh, chairman of the Russian Federation's State Committee for the Defense Branches of Industry, and A. Dyakov, president of the EES Rossii rayon production association.

"In order to accomplish the program outlined," Yevgeniy Fomin said, "the joint-stock company needs corresponding support from the government in the amount of 96 billion rubles. We are providing 36 billion of that ourselves. We will need 60 billion out of the state budget. Is that a lot? We shall save the state 500 megawatts of power by producing the new luminescent bulbs. This amounts to two and a half electric power plants of medium capacity, which it would cost at least five trillion rubles to build. And we are asking for only 60 million rubles for the entire program!"

Document:

Russia's Ministry of Economics (Ya.M. Urison)

Russia's Ministry of Finance (S.K. Dubinin)

Russia's State Committee for the Defense Industry (V.K. Glukhikh)

Russia's Ministry of Heat and Energy (Yu.K. Shafranik) and the EES Rossii (A.F. Dyakov)

have dragged out the solution of this important problem inexcusably.

I ask them to resolve this matter in accordance with instructions No. OS-P7-03006 issued by the Government of the Russian Federation on 10 June 1994.

O. Soskovets
27 May 1994

Yevgeniy Fomin leafed through a thick file of documents on official paper.

"Just look at the ministries and departments interested in our proposal. Russia's First Deputy Minister of Economics V. A. Mikhaylov: 'In view of the great efficiency of the project, the Ministry of Economics of Russia considers it expedient to include the program of the Ryazan Electronic Instrument Plant on the list of conversions newly begun in 1994.' A.Ye. Yevtushenko (Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Russia) considers it essential to accelerate the government's resolution of the matter of establishing Russian energy-conservation funds to be drawn upon for financing our program."

All of the documents were in that spirit. No one is opposed, but the matter is not moving. Everything is in idle....

An urgent affirmative resolution of the matter of financing the program of the Ryazan instrument makers is not just an economic need but a social one as well. We know that the cost of 1 kilowatt-hour of electric energy in Russia is presently lower than that of the most highly developed countries of the world. The specialists believe that electric energy prices will inevitably be freed in the future. And if that price becomes comparable to the price in the USA (125 rubles for a kilowatt-hour), half of Russia's population will start lighting torches.

This is also an ecological program. Replacing incandescent lights with compact luminescent ones will result in lowered pressure on the nation's environment by the fuel and energy complex.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Troops Chiefs' Meeting Previewed

*MK2907110094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 29 Jul 94 p 3*

[Report by Ilya Bulavinov: "Conference of CIS Border Guard Troops Commanders. Azerbaijan Guards No Borders and Would Not Let Others]

[Text] The CIS defense ministers and heads of the border guard structures are solving similar tasks: the military men are trying to create a defense union, whereas the border guards are trying to hammer out a single system of guarding the Commonwealth's external borders. Neither Pavel Grachev nor the commander in chief of Russia's border guards are succeeding in overcoming Azerbaijan's resistance and getting it to join in solving problems shared by the Commonwealth countries. It is perhaps this situation which Moscow intends to discuss first at the meeting of the CIS countries' border guard troops commanders-in-chief which began in St. Petersburg on 28 July.

The session of the council of border troops commanders will discuss a concept for guarding the CIS's external

borders in Andrey Nikolayev's interpretation. The concept, to all appearances, is virtually ready and the border guards are only making the final amendments to it, after which Nikolayev intends to submit the draft to the next sitting of the Council of Heads of State scheduled for 9 September. Apart from theoretical questions the border guards are also to discuss practical ones, on which differences are more serious. General Nikolayev intends to get solutions to questions on guarding the CIS external borders on the Caspian Sea, and questions of cooperation on the Amudarya River. The prospect of solving the Amudarya problem appears quite promising—it involves Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, whose borders are being guarded by Russians, and Uzbekistan, with whom Nikolayev should not have much difficulty agreeing with.

Things are much worse regarding those questions obstructed by Azerbaijan's unwillingness to develop cooperation with Moscow. Not only the restoration of a normal border regime with Iran on the Caspian Sea depends on the success of Nikolayev's talks with the Azerbaijanian border guards, but also, largely, the security of the entire CIS because Azerbaijan, which has neglected the guarding of its border with Iran, has become an ideal transshipment point for bringing arms and drugs into Russia and the other countries of the Commonwealth. Whether Nikolayev manages to close this breach along the Commonwealth's border or does not will become largely clear this evening.

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